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The thesis consists of a summary and four self-contained papers.  
 
Paper [I] examines the effects of interregional migration on gross earnings 
in married and cohabiting couples. In particular, we examine the link between 
education level and income gains. We find that pre-migration education level 
is a key determinant of migration and economic outcomes and is also a 
determinant of the effect of migration on income distribution within the 
household. The positive average effect on household earnings is largely 
explained by income gains among highly-educated males. Females generally 
experience no significant income gain from migration in absolute terms. 
Paper [II] analyzes the effect of the spouse’s education on individual 
earnings. In this study, we control for time-invariant heterogeneity that may be 
correlated with the spouse’s education level and use a rich data set that 
includes observations of individuals when they are single and when they are 
married. The results support the hypothesis of cross-productivity for both 
males and females. Furthermore, couples with education within the same field 
experience even larger effects. 
In Paper [III] we aim to study how the spouse’s productivity in the labor 
market affects one’s own individual earnings when married. Using 
longitudinal data on individuals as both single and married allows us to 
estimate the spouses’ productivity as single persons and thereby avoid 
problems of endogeneity between the two spouses’ labor market performances. 
Productivity is approximated with residuals from estimates of pre-marriage 
earnings equations. Results indicate that there are negative effects of the 
spouse’s productivity on individual earnings for both males and females, and 
that this effect appears to be enhanced by the duration of the marriage. 
Paper [IV] studies spousal matching on earnings for females in second-
order marriages. We aim to follow women who marry, divorce, and 
subsequently remarry compared with females who marry and stay married 
over the course of the study interval. Overall, we find significant positive 
correlations for all three of the marital partitions. The correlation tends to be 
smaller for the first of a sequence of marriages for women who divorce than 
for women who marry and stay so. For the second of the successive marriages, 
however, the correlation of the residuals is larger than that for women who 
marry but once.  
Keywords: Regional migration, two earner households, marriage, education, 
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The research area of family economics has expanded greatly during the last 
few decades where the interdependence between work and family is 
increasingly acknowledged (Lundberg, 2005). The decision whether to marry 
and whom to marry has important policy-making implications for income 
inequality within a society as well as implications on inequality between 
generations. The economic processes within a family/couple are important 
determinants for the individual’s behaviour in the labor market. For instance, a 
mandatory reduction in working hours for German males also decreased the 
working hours of their wives (Hunt and Katz, 1998) but a working hours-
reduction in France had an opposite effect; the women increased their working 
hours (Ahmed, 2004). Furthermore, the performance on the labor market may 
also affect an individual’s marital status. (Weiss and Willis, 1997; Norberg- 
Schönfeldt, 2007). 
 
The economic conditions for family life have undergone fundamental changes 
within one or two generations. Becker (1991) noted that the market and the 
state have taken over many functions that traditionally were performed by the 
family. The labor force participation of females has risen whilst a closing of 
the male-female earnings gap has resulted in a new set of demands for the 
modern family. Nowadays, more women than men attain higher education 
(Ref.) and contribute substantially to the total family income. At the same time 
and partially because of the changed role of women in the labour market and 
society, family life has become more complex with increased divorce rates and 
the emergence of alternative family constellations. Compared to the era which 
considered the male being the sole bread winner as the norm, decision making 
within the family has changed in nature because two careers have to be 
considered. Decisions on investments in human capital, for instance, can get 
rather complex since it may depend on the spouses’ relative bargaining power. 2  Introduction and Summary 
The economic outcomes of decisions may also be unevenly distributed 
between spouses which may have an effect on bargaining power and 
bargaining processes in subsequent periods. (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, 
2001; Chiappori, 1992). 
 
The thesis consists of four self-contained papers in family economics. Paper [I] 
studies the location problem for two earner couples. We aim to study the effect 
of internal migration on earnings and relative earnings for two earner couples 
and how this is related to the educational levels of the spouses. Papers [II] and 
[III] analyzes how the partners’ human capital affects the individual’s own 
earnings. Paper [II] analyzes how the individual’s earnings are affected by the 
educational level of the spouse. Paper [III] aims to study how the spouse’s 
informal human capital, as reflected in premarriage earnings, affects individual 
earnings. In Paper [IV], we study assortative mating on earnings into marriage. 
The focus is on women who remarry after a divorce. 
 
 
2  Sorting on the Marriage Market 
 
How individuals sort themselves into marriage has been analysed extensively 
in previous studies. Often it is found that individuals tend to marry others that 
are similar to themselves in various aspects. For instance, individuals typically 
marry people that are of the same race, religion, education and socioeconomic 
status (Mare, 1991; Kalmijn, 1998; Blossfeldt and Timm, 2003). Positive 
assortative matching is also found on height, weight, intelligence and earlobe 
length (Buss, 1985). Economists have focused on matching with regards to 
earnings and have thus found that individuals tend to marry others with a 
similar earnings potential (Nakosteen et al., 2004). In paper [IV], we study 
sorting into two consecutive marriages, whilst particularly looking to answer, 
is the sorting on earnings stronger for women in their second marriage? Introduction and Summary  3 
 
The sorting of individuals into marriage has economic implications for the 
society in many ways. It affects integration and also has effects on inequality 
both within and between generations. Marital matching has implications for 
the income distribution in the society as a whole and plays a significant role in 
the persistence of economic status across generations (Chadwick and Solon, 
2002). Hirvonen (2008) finds that assortative mating on income contributes to 
intergenerational immobility in Sweden. Furthermore, Ehrmish et al., (2006) 
reports that up to 50 percent of the immobility in income between generations 
can be attributed to the person to whom one is married. Fernandez and 
Rogerson (2001) show that increased sorting on education into marriage 
increases income inequality in society. 
 
The sorting of individuals is also likely to affect the processes within marriage 
and thereby the welfare of the individuals in the couple. The relationship 
between family background and labor market success is widely explored. The 
educational levels of the parents have been found to have an effect on the 
educational level of their children. The higher the parent’s own education, the 
more likely the children are to perform well in school and obtain higher 
education (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Also, there exists a link between 
parental education and the children’s health (Currie and Moretti, 2003). How 
the current family’s characteristics affect the earnings of the individual are not 
studied to the same extent. Papers [II] and [III] studies how a partner’s 
characteristics affects the individual’s earnings. Will the spouses reinforce or 
offset each others’ attributes?  Interaction effects within marriage may enhance 
the individual earnings and thereby increase family earnings. This may affect 
the income inequality in the society as well as having an effect on the degree 
of intergenerational mobility. 
 
 
 4  Introduction and Summary 
3  Marriage, decision making and earnings 
 
Early models of family behaviour, labelled as common preferences models 
(Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1974), imply that family decisions are consistent 
with maximising a single utility function. The gains from marriage stem from 
specialization and division of labor due to comparative advantage. This does 
not imply necessarily that the spouses specialize completely in either 
housework or market work. Since housework is exhausting, this could lead the 
individual with more household responsibilities to choose market work that is 
less demanding which would lead to lower earnings (Becker, 1985). A 
common feature of the common preference models are pooling of incomes. 
This means that a given increase in income has the same effect on utility and 
consumer demand irrespective of which of the spouses earns whatever income. 
In a bargaining model, the individuals are assumed to maximize their 
individual utility and the behaviour of the family whilst being not only 
dependent on total family income (ceteris paribus) but also on the spouses’ 
bargaining power (Lundberg and Pollack, 1996). Educational level and income 
are two factors assumed to affect the individuals’ bargaining power. This 
implies that decisions in the family about for instance: division of labor, 
fertility, consumption and where to live are likely to depend on the educational 
level of the spouses. All these different aspects of married life can influence 
the individual’s earnings. 
 
The decision where to reside can also be rather complex for a family, since the 
couple may have two careers to encompass. The location that maximizes the 
family’s joint utility may not be the location that maximizes the individual’s 
own utility if being single, where one or both spouses may be tied migrants or 
tied stayers (Mincer, 1978). Paper [1] analyzes the effect of migration on 
individual earnings as well as on the female earnings share for married 
couples, in regard to the educational level of the spouses. Introduction and Summary  5 
 
If the productivities of the spouses can be seen as substitutes according to 
Becker’s theory of marriage, optimal matching is achieved if high productivity 
individuals marry others that are more productive in other areas, such as 
household work. Becker, furthermore, suggests that the educational levels of 
the spouses are complements. In this case, positive matching on education is 
optimal and the gains from marriage are assumed to increase with these 
complementary attributes. Higher education is likely to result in increased 
ability in processing information, cognitive skills and the ability to cope with 
change, which may yield cross-productivity effects. A spouse with higher 
education might possess better capacity to give advice and share information 
that can benefit their partner’s career (Benham, 1974). Paper [II] studies the 
effects of the spouse’s educational level on the individual’s own earnings. The 
effect of a spouse’s education is assumed to increase if the spouse’s 
educational fields are the same. The ability to provide knowledge and access to 
networks ought to be easier if the fields of education are the same. As paper 
[II] studies the effect of the spouse’s formal human capital, in form of 
education; paper [III] deals with the effect of the spouse’s informal human 
capital, “productivity”, as manifested in earnings. An approximation of the 
spouse’s productivity is achieved by estimating the difference between the 
spouse’s actual and expected earnings, i.e., residuals from an earnings 
equation. As stated above, this productivity of the spouse is expected to have a 
negative effect according to the theory of specialization; however, an 
alternative hypothesis is that the productivity will yield positive spill over 
effects on the other spouse’s earnings. The productivity of the spouses may be 
complements in the labor market where one or both spouses may be able to 
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4 Identification 
 
The notion that married men have higher earnings than unmarried men is a 
well known finding in empirical labor economics. These gains stem partly 
from selection into marriage (Ribar, 2004), i.e., males that get married are 
more productive in either state, single or married. Also, highly educated 
individuals tend to marry other highly educated individuals and likewise high 
earners tend to marry each other (Mare, 1991; Smith, 1979; Lam, 1988; 
Nakosteen et al., 2004). A number of studies report a positive correlation 
between individual earnings and spousal education (Benham, 1974; Jepsen, 
2005; Tiefenthaler, 1997). Since there is positive matching into marriage on 
both earnings and education, some of the correlation is due to selection. When 
studying the effects of spousal education on individual earnings in paper [II], 
we exploit data on individuals over a period of time within which they 
experience both singlehood and marriage. This allows us to isolate the effect of 
spousal education that arises within the marriage from selection effects on the 
marriage market.  
 
As depicted above, the labor supply and earnings during marriage may be 
affected by the division of labor within the couple, the behaviour of the 
partner, circumstances that characterize married life as well as other exogenous 
factors that affect both spouses’ earnings. The earnings of the spouses during 
marriage are the result of both potential specialization processes and cross-
productivity, which means that identifying the effect of the spouse’s 
characteristics on individual earnings from observations on existing couples, is 
problematic. Clearly one spouse’s labor market outcomes are endogenous to 
the other’s market outcomes, such as working hours and earnings. A common 
solution to this is to estimate with instrumental variable techniques (Daniel, 
1992; Gray, 1997; Chun and Lee, 2001). Another empirical strategy is 
however employed in this thesis. Paper [III] utilizes information about the Introduction and Summary  7 
 
individuals before they marry to avoid this endogeneity. The spouse’s 
productivity is estimated from observations on the individuals when single 
three years before marriage.  
 
A similar setup is used in paper [IV]. The empirical literature on assortative 
mating is fairly large. Most studies estimate the correlation in earnings as 
married, i.e., based on observations earnings among existing couples. Using 
this approach, Smith (1979) and Lam (1988) find a positive correlation 
implying positive assortative mating. A limitation in these studies is that they 
estimate the correlation of residuals for existing marriages. These residuals are 
likely to be affected by the marriage and processes within the marriage, and 
thus might not be informative about the sorting process that paired the spouses 
to begin with. In Paper [IV], we estimate the correlation in pre-marriage 
earnings among individuals that eventually marry and compare the sorting 
between first and second marriages.  
 
 
5  Data and Institutional setting 
 
The data used in all four studies within this thesis consists of Swedish register 
data covering the entire Swedish population. This exploits detailed data 
registers from the Swedish population, which are compiled by Statistics 
Sweden and the Labor Market Board of Sweden. These registers are 
longitudinal in nature, which allows us to follow individuals through time. 
Each individual has a family identification code which makes it possible to 
link family members and married couples to each other. Unmarried cohabitant 
couples are only registered if they have a child in common. Cohabitation is 
common in Sweden, it is generally accepted, so having children without being 
married is not controversial. A survey from 1999, show that, an overwhelming 
majority of the young Swedes approve of childbearing and childrearing within 8  Introduction and Summary 
unmarried couples (Bernhardt, 2002). Swedish legislation provides some 
protection for the weaker party if a cohabitant relationship ends; however, it is 
limited compared to that provided for married couples. Thus, we will use the 
terms married and marriage synonymously with cohabitating and cohabitation. 
 
Sweden is often considered one of the most gender equal countries in the 
world
1 and has among the highest labor force participation rates for women in 
the OECD. A number of public policies support the combination of family and 
work for both men and women. The abolishment of joint taxation in 1971 
helped increase the labor force participation of females (Gustafsson, 1992). 
Other explanations for high labor force participation among females are the 
public parental leave insurance and the vast expansion of public child care. 
The public provision of child care is highly available and subventionized, 
where 73 percent of all children aged 1-6 were enrolled in some pre-school 
facility in 1997 (Skolverket, The Swedish National Agency for Education, 
1997). Swedish parental leave
2 is a generous public insurance available to both 
men and women. The parents are entitled to a total of 360 days of parental 
leave per child with reimbursement that is a function of their gross wage 
earnings. Since 1995, one month of the total parental leave is reserved for the 
father; one objective for this was to contribute to more equal labor market 
opportunities for men and women. Another feature that increased labor force 






                                                 
1 See e.g., The Global Gender Gap Report (2009) or Gender Empowerment Measure Index in 
UNDP (2007). 
2 See Lundqvist and Roman (2008).The rules described are from January 1995 and there have been 
slight modifications since, e. g., the number of days have been extended to 480. Introduction and Summary  9 
 
6  Summary of the four papers 
 
Paper [I] Sex and Migration: Who is the Tied Mover? 
Paper [I] analyses the effects of inter-regional migration on two-earner 
households’ gross earnings and on the relative income between married men 
and women. In particular, we examine the connection between the education 
level and relative income gains between spouses. Migration is seen as an 
investment in human capital that is assumed to increase the welfare and 
productivity of labor (Becker, 1974). The decision to move is more complex 
for a married couple compared to singles since they have to consider two 
potential careers.  
 
Maximising the family’s utility can lead to one or both partners not being able 
to maximize their individual utility as if they were single which is commonly 
throughout the literature called tied migration (Mincer, 1978). In bargaining 
models, individuals are generally assumed to maximize their individual utility 
where the behaviour of the family is not only dependent on total family income 
(ceteris paribus) but also on the spouses’ bargaining power (Lundberg and 
Pollak, 1996). The educational level is in this paper considered a potential 
proxy for bargaining power.  
 
The empirical analysis is based on longitudinal data and functional regional 
labour markets as regional entities. We use propensity score matching to 
estimate the effect of migration. The outcome of a sample of stayers generally 
serves as an estimate for a counterfactual outcome. The estimated effect of 
migration can be biased if the selection mechanism is correlated with the 
outcome, i.e.,  migrants may have attributes that makes them more productive 
in any location. Propensity score matching relies on the assumption that, 
conditional on some observable characteristics, outcomes are independent of 
the assignment to treatment. Using this approach, it is found that migration 10  Introduction and Summary 
generally increases total gross wage earnings of households and has no 
significant impact on the male/female earnings gap. Furthermore, we find that 
the level of education is a key determinant of migration and the economic 
outcome. The positive average effect on household earnings is largely 
explained by income gains among highly educated males. Females experience, 
on average, no significant income gain in absolute terms from migration. 
Judging from the overall pattern of point estimates in earnings effects, the 
relative male/female educational level seems to affect the relative income gain 
between spouses in the anticipated direction. However, females gain 
significantly in terms of relative income only if highly educated and 
married/cohabitant with a low educated male. The statistical evidence in this 
study does not provide a sufficient basis for strong conclusions in this regard. 
 
 
Paper [II] The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings – A 
Study of Married Swedish Couples. 
Paper [II] studies if the earnings of an individual are affected by the 
educational level of the spouse. A positive association between spousal 
education and individual earnings is a common empirical finding (e.g. 
Benham, 1974 and Rossetti and Tanda, 2000). This association is most often 
attributed to selection and cross productivity.  
 
A spouse with higher education might possess better capacity to give advice 
and share information that can benefit their partner’s career (Benham, 1974). 
Also, it may be the case that a highly productive spouse counteracts the 
depreciation of the partner’s human capital. Education does not only have 
direct economic benefits, such as higher earnings and lower probability for 
unemployment, it also affects the individual in other parts of life. Individuals 
with higher education have better health and are more likely to engage in 
healthy behavior (Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Cutler and Glaeser, 2005). Introduction and Summary  11 
 
Higher education also decreases the probability to engage in criminal behavior 
(Lochner and Morreti, 2004). The lifestyle and health choices of a spouse may 
thereby affect the partner’s own health and thus affect earnings. Relatively 
speaking, the general effect from education that influences health and lifestyle 
is likely to be closely associated to the spouse’s level of education. Moreover, 
a common field of education should have a larger impact on the cross 
productivity effect. The possibility to provide direct help and specific 
knowledge is expected to be greater if the spouse has a degree in the same field 
of education.  
 
To identify the effect of spousal education within the framework of a fixed 
effects model there needs to be variation in the educational level of the spouse. 
However, very limited numbers of individuals change their educational level 
after they get married. To ensure variation in the educational level of the 
spouse, we restrict the sample to individuals that are single at least one year 
during the observed period. The results support the cross productivity 
hypothesis for both males and females. Furthermore, couples that have 
education within the same field of experience incur larger additional effects. 
 
 
Paper [III] The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings: Human 
Capital Spillover or Specialization? 
In this paper, how the productivity of one’s spouse affects own individual 
earnings in the labor market is studied. The bargaining processes and the 
interaction within marriage, affecting labor supply and earnings, are likely to 
depend on the spouses’ labor market characteristics. Marrying someone 
successful will probably affect the individual’s earnings differently than 
marrying someone less fortunate or successful in the labor market. The 
spouses can assist each other in the labor market so the spouses’ productivities 
may be complements or the spouses will specialize in market work and 12  Introduction and Summary 
domestic work respectively, i.e., take advantage of comparative advantage. 
Individuals marry persons similar to themselves in age and education which 
implies that their earnings are likely to be correlated (Mare, 1991; Nakosteen 
et al., 2004). The part of the spouses’ earnings that are attributed to these and 
other measured factors will be controlled for. In this study, the focus will be on 
how the unexplained part of the spouse’s earnings i.e., the difference between 
expected and actual earnings, affects one’s own earnings. To avoid problems 
with endogeneity, the productivity of the spouse is estimated before the 
individuals form a couple. Utilizing information on the individuals being 
single before they marry makes it possible to study how the high productivity 
of one spouse will affect the other’s earnings when they are married. 
 
The estimated effects of the spouses’ productivity on individual earnings are 
on average negative. This suggests that the higher the spouses premarital 
productivity, the lower the individual’s earnings during marriage. The results 
also show that this negative effect is enhanced by the duration of the marriage. 
This is in line with the specialization hypothesis that predicts that the effect 
will increase as the partners obtain more and more specific skills. However, 
closer examination shows that it is the sample of young men and women that 
are driving the results. Males and females over 35 years of age do not seem to 
be affected negatively by their spouse’s premarital productivity. A possible 
explanation for differences in results between age groups may be that the 
demands in household work are greater for young couples. 
 
 
Paper [IV] Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings. Among 
Women in First and Second Marriages. 
The economics of marriage markets was followed by research concerning 
determinants of separation and divorce, as exemplified by Becker, Landes and 
Michael (1977). There is today a substantial volume of research on marital Introduction and Summary  13 
 
matching along with determinants and consequences of divorce. 
Accompanying the trend in marital disruption has been pervasive incidences of 
remarriage; a substantial proportion of individuals who end their first 
marriages tend to enter subsequent unions. This study attempts to extend the 
literature by examining spousal matching in second-order marriages of 
females. We follow women who marry, divorce and subsequently remarry 
against their counterparts who marry and stay married over the course of the 
study interval. 
 
The sorting in second marriages is important for public policy purposes, since 
the incomes of single mothers tend to be lower and marriage may be seen as a 
potential way out of poverty. What the remarriage literature has not yet 
addressed is the issue of marital matching in second marriages. Knowledge of 
the matching process can contribute to a better understanding of the extent, if 
any, to which matching in second marriages differs from first marriages. In 
particular, given the pervasiveness of higher-order marriages in many 
countries, improved understanding of the sorting process that brings second 
spouses together can be informative about the long term stability of second 
versus first marriages. 
 
As described above, people tend to marry persons with similar levels of 
education, age and ethnicity, which are correlated with earnings. Moreover, 
spouses reside in the same region and therefore share the economic fortunes of 
the regional economy. Consequently, our preferred measure of marital 
matching, following Becker (1981), Smith (1979) and others, is the estimated 
correlation between residuals. These residuals capture characteristics of 
individuals which affect earnings but are not accounted for by explanatory 
variables as they include traits such as confidence, ambition, possible family 
connections that impact earnings, and mental or emotional health. However, 
these characteristics are likely to be visible to potential spouses. 14  Introduction and Summary 
 
Overall, we find significant positive correlations for all sets of marriages 
where the magnitudes are consistent with previous studies. Furthermore, the 
correlation tends to be smaller for the first in a sequence of marriages for 
women who divorce than for women who marry and stay so. For the second of 
the successive marriages, however, the correlation of the residuals is larger 
than that for women who marry only once. Women who marry twice tend to 
select and match in a similar fashion the second time around; if anything, that 
tendency for positive matching on earnings is stronger in the second marriage. 
The continuous sorting of strong earners into marriage may contribute to shifts 
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Investments in human capita, including investments in health, education, and 
migration, are important for individuals, households, and for society as a 
whole. In a reasonably functioning economy, these investments are expected to 
increase the productivity of labour and welfare. They may also have 
substantial effects on income distribution between income earners within the 
household and within society in general. Investments in education and 
geographic mobility may provide opportunities to reduce income differences 
between males and females, but these investments may also reinforce existing 
income differences by asymmetrically favouring the careers of one gender.  
 
This study examines the effects of migration on total household gross earnings 
and the relative income within married or cohabitating couples in Sweden. We 
devote special attention to the link between education level and the economic 
effect of migration for the spouses, because education level is a potential 
indicator of bargaining power, which plays a decisive role in modern theories 
of intra-household income distribution (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, 2001). 
The  studies within this field of research are relevant to international trends 
such as increases in the number of dual-income households, investments in 
education,  proportions of females entering higher education, and interest in 
issues regarding gender equality.  
 
Empirical economic research on migration has typically been oriented towards 
examining the determinants of migration and, to a somewhat lesser degree, its 
effect on income for singles or couples. Only a small fraction of migration 
research has been designed to study the effects on intra-household income 
distribution. Jacobsen and Levin (2000) examine interstate migration in the 
U.S. during the 1980s and report income gains for single women only. For  Sex and Migration…  2 
married couples, they find that the economic outcome of migration is negative, 
without any effect on the relative income between spouses. Smits (2001) uses 
data on married couples in the Netherlands and finds that migration has a 
negative effect on earnings for both spouses. Smits (2001) also finds that most 
long-distance moves occur in order to accommodate the male’s career. Cooke 
(2003) studies married couples in the U.S. and finds that migration increases 
the husband’s income while leaving the wife’s income unchanged, which is 
consistent with results from an earlier American study by Sandell (1977). 
Cooke finds that this result holds even if a wife has greater earning potential 
than her husband. Nivalainen (2004) studies Finnish households and finds that 
migration largely occurs due to the demands of the husband’s career, causing 
wives to become so-called tied migrants. Employment after migration is 
examined in Nivalainen (2005). The results indicate that employment among 
the majority of men is unaffected. However, some groups of migrating 
husbands have higher employment probabilities after migration, while women 
never realise the same positive returns in employment opportunities. Taylor 
(2007) uses information about reasons for migration within the UK to find that 
a majority of couples moving for job-related reasons are motivated by the 
husband’s job opportunities. Taylor (2007) also finds that the probability of 
employment following a move is reduced more for tied movers than for non-
migrants, and this effect is especially large for women.  
 
Using data on two-earner households in Sweden, Axelsson and Westerlund 
(1998) find that migration does not affect real disposable income. Nilsson 
(2000) also examines Swedish data and concludes that migration increases the 
intra-household income gap within young households in which both spouses 
hold university-level graduate degrees. 
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The present study adds to current literature by focusing on the role of 
education and income levels for changes in internal family income distribution 
among a broad representation of dual-income households that relocate to 
another geographic labour market. Sweden provides an excellent ground for 
exploring these questions because of the high availability of data and the 
internationally high rate of labour force participation rate among women. We 
use longitudinal register data on a large sample of individuals who were 
married or cohabitating prior to and after migration. Regional labour markets 
are defined by commuting patterns between places of residence and 
workplaces, rather than by historically-defined administrative borders.   
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II gives a brief summary of 
distribution theories on families and family migration. Section III presents the 
data and methods of estimation. Section IV provides the estimation results, 
followed by a summary of findings in Section V. 
 
 
II   Income distribution within the family and migration  
 
One of the most common theoretical frameworks in economic studies of 
migration is the human capital model. In this model, individual utility varies 
across potential locations. An individual chooses to reside in the location that 
maximises utility based on location-specific costs and benefits (including the 
long-term costs for relocation). The human capital model has straightforward 
implications for a single decision-maker; for families, the decision to invest in 
migration is much more complex.  
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Within early models of family behaviour, which are often called common 
preferences models, the consensus model (Samuelson, 1956) and the altruist 
model (Becker, 1974) imply that family decisions are consistent with 
maximising a single utility function. One common feature of common 
preference models involves the pooling of incomes according to which the 
incomes of both spouses are pooled together and the allocation of expenditures 
is independent of the relative contributions by husband or wife. This means 
that a given increase in income has the same effect on family utility and 
consumer demand, irrespective of which spouse provides the income. 
Empirical evidence is generally inconsistent with this income pooling 
assumption, while more recent bargain models of family decisions seem to 
provide a more credible analysis of the migration decision than older common 
preferences models (Lundberg and Pollack, 1996).  
 
For a dual-income household, migration affects the future careers and utility of 
both spouses. Presumably, a substantial share of family migrations involves 
compromises in the sense that a particular location may be optimal for the 
family, but it would not necessarily be optimal for an individual spouse if they 
were single. The term tied migration refers to the situation in which a spouse 
moves along with his/her partner even though the individual gain from the so-
called “family optimum” is lower than the gain from the so-called “free 
optimum”. At a location that is optimal for the family, total family utility is 
maximised, and thus, the tied migrant must receive enough compensation from 
the partner to migrate and stay in the relationship (Mincer, 1978). Similarly, 
one spouse may also be a tied stayer, receiving enough compensation from the 
other spouse to remain in the present location as well as in the marriage. It is 
also possible that both spouses are tied migrants or tied stayers. 
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In a bargaining model, it is assumed that individuals maximise their own 
utility and that family behaviour is not only dependent on total family income 
ceteris paribus but also on the determinants of a payoff in case no agreement is 
reached, which is called the threat point (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). A threat 
point can be either external (such as divorce) or internal (i.e., an inefficient 
non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage). Presumably, the most extreme 
threat point for most couples is divorce, an outcome for which the threat point 
and the bargained outcome depend on external factors such as a spouse’s 
opportunities outside the marriage. In everyday bargaining, the internal threat 
point is more relevant. A family’s consumption is assumed to depend on the 
income-earning party within the marriage in contrast to pooling-based income 
models. The bargained outcome depends upon utility at the threat point, and 
family decisions  depend on the higher-earning party within the marriage. It is 
reasonable to assume that the allocation problem has an external threat point, 
the spouses separate or divorce when they cannot agree on a residential 
location.  
 
In the human capital model according to which a single utility function is 
maximised, it is assumed that the tied mover is compensated for a loss suffered 
from migration. The cooperative bargaining models assume that all agreements 
can be reinforced and that there are no restrictions on agreements made within 
the family. Furthermore, the cooperative models always lead to Pareto efficient 
outcomes (Chiappori, 1992). It is unlikely, however, that a couple can make 
binding agreements about the future distribution of resources within a 
marriage. Lundberg and Pollak (2001) illustrate a non-cooperative two-stage 
game in which a location is determined in the first stage and the distribution of 
resources is allocated in the second stage. An investment in human capital thus 
yields different returns for the two individuals, thereby affecting bargaining 
power in future negotiations as well as each spouse’s ability to claim family  Sex and Migration…  6 
resources in the future. If it is impossible for spouses to make binding 
agreements about the future transfers of resources, the allocation problem may 
result in an inefficient outcome, such as an inefficient location or an inefficient 
divorce. An inefficient location is characterised by failing to maximise total 
household income. The tied spouse prefers a bigger piece of a smaller pie, and 
the leading spouse prefers to be married rather than being separated with a 
higher income.  
 
Modern theories seem to accommodate empirical observations that are 
inconsistent with the older common preferences and income pooling models, 
and they generate several interesting and seemingly realistic implications. 
However, it appears extremely difficult to pursue rigorous empirical tests of 
these models, and thus, we make no such aspiration.
1 The specific empirical 
questions addressed here are:  
-  Does migration yield income gain for the household as a whole?  
-  Does migration affect relative income between spouses? 
-  How do observed changes in earnings relate to education level in 
terms of relative bargaining power? 
Educational attainment is correlated with potential wage level. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to presume that education would affect a family’s location decision 
as well as any returns from migration for both parties. Moreover, bargaining 
models suggest that some covariates in empirical household models of 
migration and post-migration income may be perceived as indicators of 
bargaining power. As pointed out by Lundberg and Pollak (2001), education is 
a possible candidate in this respect.  
                                                 
1Naturally, changes in wages or incomes do not translate into changes in utility by necessity. It is, 
for example, very difficult to incorporate a complete set of relevant indicators of compensating 
wage and income differentials into empirical models. Sex and Migration… 
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III  Data and estimation 
 
Data 
We use annual panel data from various official registers from the Swedish 
National Tax Board, the National Labour Market Administration of Sweden, 
and Statistics Sweden. An advantage of this data is that spatial migration 
dimensions are delineated in terms of functional regions called Labor Market 
Areas. Created by Statistics Sweden, Labor Market Areas are based on an 
algorithm that exploits commuting flows within and between clusters of 
municipalities.  The algorithm creates a set of 89 regions during the period of 
study in which commuting flows across borders are minimised.  Since 
commuting options are limited between Labor Market Areas, migration is the 
most viable option for workers who are taking advantage of employment 
opportunities in other regions.  This makes data more amenable to studies of 
labour-related migration, as opposed historically- or politically-defined 
regions. Migration is thus defined to occur when the Labor Market Area of 
residence changes between years.
2  
 
The sample used in this study pertains to residents in Sweden who were 
between 25-45 years old in 1997 and married or cohabitants with the same 
partner during 1997 and 2003. In the register data, two individuals are 
cohabitants if they are registered at the same address and if they have a child in 
common. Registered partnerships of same-sex couples are excluded. In line 
with most previous studies, we confine the analysis to couples who remained 
married or cohabitating during the period of observation, as such couples have 
                                                 
2 This is the place of residence in December 31 according to official registers.   Sex and Migration…  8 
internalised the external effects of family ties (Mincer, 1978).
3 Using 
propensity score matching and balancing tests, we found strong indications of 
lacking comparability between moving and staying households with respect to 
the variable measuring pre-migration unemployment. For this reason, we 
confine the analysis to households with spouses that were either employed or 
outside the labour force in 1997.
4 This sample includes 125,891 couples, of 
which 1,911 migrated in 1998 or 1999. Sample means are given in Table 1, 
which distinguishes the sample by migration status and gender. For males, the 
mean of pre-migration earnings in 1997 terms is around 240,000 (SEK) for 
both movers and stayers, while the mean of post-migration earnings is higher 
among movers. The time path of average earnings for females indicates a 
slightly larger increase among migrants. Movers tend to be younger and have 
higher education than stayers, which is in line with our expectations.  
                                                 
3Couples that divorce during the period are not included. Descriptive statistics show that most 
divorces occur prior to a move and that couples that move together are not more or less likely to 
divorce. 
4 We conduct separate analysis for households experiencing unemployment in 1997; the results are 
discussed briefly in Section IV.  Sex and Migration… 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Stayers    Movers 
Variable
5 Females  Males    Females  Males 
Individual  attributes        
Gross wage earningsearnings 1997  1345.98 2426.08  1184.83  2417.62 
Gross wage earningsearnings 2000  1610.80 2841.27  1474.71  3143.56 
Gross wage earningsearnings 2001  1690.11 2923.94 
 
1612.84 3254.29 
Gross wage earningsearnings 2002  1764.26 2938.02  1700.33 3320.75 
Gross wage earningsearnings 2003  1819.99 2934.96  1797.11 3378.10 
Female earnings share 1997  0.376    0.342   
Female earnings share 2000  0.388    0.345   
Female earnings share 2001  0.394    0.363   
Female earnings share 2002  0.402    0.364   
Female earnings share 2003  0.409    0.376   
Age   35.55 37.43    33.22 34.87 
Student 1997  .051  .015    .097  .063 
Elementary school or Compulsory school .101 .169    .074 .085 
2-year secondary school  .398 .374    .224 .215 
3-year secondary school  .133 .122    .116 .119 
<3 years of university  .220 .173    .266 .223 
≥3 years of university  .143 .151 
 
.311 .319 
Ph. D  .003 .0118  .006  .036 
Farming  .011 .032 
 
.004 .021 
Manufacturing  .108 .273  .077 .196 
Construction  .013 .108 
 
.0131 .058 
Retail  .154 .238  .127 .193 
Private sector  .103 .143  .105 .166 
Public sector  .537 .171  .532 .301 
Couple attributes       
Child(ren)  .927 .927  829  .829 
Small children  .335 .335  .519 .519 
Welfare benefit  .018 .018    .049 .049 
Migration history   .031 .031    .268 .268 
Regional attributes:         
Access  -3.063 -3.063   -3.190 -3.190 
Stockholm county  .201 .201    .209 .209 
South of Sweden  .141 .141    .103 .103 
Population 402,213  402,213    387,124  387,124 
Number of observations:  123,980  123,980    1,911  1,911 
 
 
                                                 




Migration can be perceived as a treatment as compared to the non-treatment 
alternative of staying. The potential outcomes are Y1 for migration and Y0 for 
staying. For each individual, there is a pair of outcomes of which only one can 
be observed. The parameter of main interest is in this case the one which 
measures the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT = E[Y1 - Y0 | M = 1], 
where M equals 1 for migration and 0 for non-migration. Clearly, Y0 | M = 1 
(i.e., what would happen to the migrants if they had not moved) cannot be 
observed. The outcomes of a sample of stayers thus serve as an estimate for 
this counterfactual outcome. The estimated effect of treatment can be biased if 
the selection mechanism is correlated with the outcome, such as in cases in 
which migrants have attributes that make them more mobile and more 
productive in any location.  
 
Propensity score matching relies on the assumption that conditional on some 
observable characteristics X, potential outcomes are independent of the 
assignment to treatment. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that this 
conditional independence assumption also holds for some function of X; that 
is,  ) ( | 0 X p M Y ⊥ , where p(X) is the so-called propensity score and the 
probability that M = 1 given X.  A condition of common support is added, 
which is that p(X) < 1 if ATT is the parameter of interest. This guarantees that 
a non-treated match exists for each treated individual. The propensity score 
may be estimated, for example, by binomial logit or probit. 
 
We have a large set of non-migrants that is exploited to construct our 
comparison group. By using more than one individual as a counterfactual, bias 
                                                 
6 See e.g., Heckman et al., (1998).  Sex and Migration… 
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increases, but variance is reduced. When propensity scores are asymmetrically 
distributed, a kernel-based procedure is beneficial, since it only uses the 
additional observations if they actually exist. The kernel-based procedure 
matches a migrant with comparable individuals among stayers. Assuming a 
migrant with outcome  i Y  and propensity score pi, kernel matching constructs 
its counterfactual outcome,  0 ˆ Y , from non-treated individuals with pj within a 
predetermined bandwidth h of pi and attaches more importance to closer 





































Note that the weights of the kernel K sum to one.
7 The purpose of the matching 
procedure is to balance the covariates between migrants and non-migrants, 
making the distribution of the counterfactual outcome of staying the same for 
the group of migrants. The estimated effect of migration is the observed 
average difference between the outcomes of the migrants and non-migrants in 
the matched sample.  
 
In the present study, we use the method of difference-in-difference propensity 
score matching to estimate the effect of migration on household incomes and 
                                                 
7 The weight of each untreated yj is 
{} ∑
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relative incomes between spouses. By using information about the outcome 
variable before treatment, it is possible to eliminate potential bias due to time-
invariant heterogeneity.
8 The difference-in-differences estimator can be written 
as Y 1 - Y0 = (Y1t+i – Y1t) – (Y0t+i – Y0t), where the subscripts t and t+i denote 
periods of time before and after migration.
9 The outcome variable in our main 
approach is constructed as [WE1997+i - WE1997], where WE denotes real annual 
wage earnings, and i is between three and six years. We do this to distinguish 
eventual differences between immediate effects from  effects that emerge over 
a few years.  
 
We also examine the effect of migration on changes in the female share of 






















. This is also estimated after one, two, 
three and four years following the move. 
 
Propensity score matching accounts for observed heterogeneity. The 
specification of the outcome as the difference-in-differences eliminates bias 
due to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that affects earnings. It should 
be noted that we take advantage of rich information on both individual and 
household characteristics. Together with the difference-in-difference approach, 
this should substantially reduce potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity. 
                                                 
8 Smith and Todd (2005) find that difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimates 
are substantially less biased than cross-sectional matching estimates. 
9 The method of matching avoids the functional form restrictions of, for example, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and also offers flexibility, as counterfactual outcomes are calculated for each 
treated individual. OLS regression techniques impose greater weight to the treatment effects for 
values of X that occur often and in cases in which the variance in M is relatively large. Given 
heterogeneous treatment effects, the OLS estimate of treatment does not correspond with ATT, and 
as pointed out by Angrist (1998), this may not necessarily be an interesting estimate for an 
economic researcher. Sex and Migration… 
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IV   Results 
 
The covariates in the estimation of the propensity score should have a causal 
effect on the probability likelihood of moving as well as on changes in income. 
A large number of attributes that according to theory and previous may affect 
both the the probability of moving and earnings, have been tested in the 
specification of the propensity score.
10 First, we estimate logit equations to 
identify which covariates influence the probability to move.
11 Second, we run 
regressions to see whether the variables from the first stage affect the 
difference in earnings and the difference in female earnings share in 1997, 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. The same set of variables is used in the 
estimations for all sub-samples. Separate tests for each sub-sample indicate 
that the matched samples are well balanced with respect to the included 
covariates. Because the distributions of estimated propensity scores are quite 
dense (namely, between 0.01 and 0.05), we have chosen a rather small 
bandwidth of 0.005. The choice of bandwidth is a trade-off between bias and 
variance. With a high bandwidth, the bias increases, and the variance 
decreases. Robustness checks using a smaller bandwidth of 0.001 and a larger 
of 0.01 indicate no substantial changes in results. 
 
A common support restriction is imposed on the treated units, and thus, 
observations on migrants with propensity scores that are larger (smaller) than 
the highest (lowest) propensity score in the control group are not matched. 
Also, the five percent of treated observations with the lowest propensity score 
of control observations are eliminated. However, relaxing the common support 
                                                 
10 The specification of the propensity scores is given in Appendix, Table A2. The propensity 
scores have been estimated for the entire sample and separately conditioned on the educational 
level of the spouses. This allows for different parameter specifications by education.  
11 Overmatching, i.e., using too many covariates to estimate the propensity score increases the 
mean squared error and may cause problems with common support (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005, 
Waernbaum 2008). We have excluded variables with p-values of .2 or above.   Sex and Migration…  14
restrictions only marginally changes the estimated results, yielding no 
implications regarding the conclusions of this study. 
 
The kernel-matching estimate of ATT for the whole sample is given in Table 
2.
12 The results indicate a positive average effect on post-migration gross wage 
earnings at the household level of about 25,700 SEK (about €2,400) four years 
after the move and about 21,400 SEK for males and  4,300 SEK for females.
13 
The definition of migration in this study makes it possible for non-mover 
couples to actually migrate in subsequent years 
 
Table 2. Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of migration 
on gross wage earnings (in 100 SEK)  
Outcome Females  Males  Household 




























Number of couples 
Movers (off support) 
125,891 
1,911 (9) 
Note: The estimates are based on the Normal kernel with bandwidth .005 and a common 
support restriction. The 5% of observations on migrants with the lowest propensity score 
density are removed. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors
14 in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
12 Stata/SE 10.1 is used for estimation. 
13 The share of the movers (stayers) in higher education in 2000 is 3.7% (1.4%) for men and 9.5% 
(7.5%) for women. The share taking parental leave in 2000 is 46.9% (38.9%) for men and 63.5% 
(55.0%) for women. When controlling for age, a substantial portion of these differences disappear. 
We expect that when controlling for educational level and other covariates, this difference 
becomes even smaller. This should not influence our results. 
14 In large samples, there is evidence that the component of the variance from the estimation of the 
propensity scores can be disregarded (Eichler and Lechner, 2002). Sex and Migration… 
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 If anything, this should bias the results downwards. The point estimates are all 
positive, indicating positive returns from migration overall. However, the 
estimated gains for females are not significantly different from zero.  
 
To see whether these results hold when conditioning on the education level of 
the spouses, which is a potential indicator of bargaining power, we carry out 
separate estimations for different educational combinations within couples in 
Tables 3 and 4. If an individual has a university education, he/she is labelled as 




Table 3. Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of migration on 
gross wage earnings, conditional on the female having low education.
      
 Females  Males  Household 
Outcome  Male’s education  Male’s education  Male’s education 
Low High Low High Low  High 
















































Number of couples 
Movers (off support) 




Note: The estimates are based on the Normal kernel with bandwidth .005 and a common support 
restriction. The 5% of observations on migrants with the lowest propensity score density are 
removed. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 3 provides the results conditioned on females having low education. 
Most estimates are statistically insignificant. Looking at the point estimates of 
                                                 
15 A separate analysis for households experiencing unemployment in 1997 provides similar results, 
but the standard errors are larger.  Sex and Migration…  16
ATT, the estimated effect between 1997 and 2000 for low-educated females 
married to low-educated males indicate a reduction in earnings of about 7,500 
SEK (a point estimate of -73.53). Low-educated females living with high-
educated males experience an estimated loss in earnings between 1997 and 
2000 of about 1,400 SEK (a point estimate of -14.38). For low-educated males 
married to low-educated females, the estimated increase in earnings is 400 
SEK (a point estimate of -4.09). The estimated effect on earnings between 
1997 and 2000 for high-educated males married to low-educated females is an 
increase of 37,700 SEK (a point estimate of is 374.33). 
 
For a low-educated female in 1997, the returns from migration for the 
household as a whole differs with respect to her male partner's education level 
(Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3). A couple in which both spouses have low 
education experiences no monetary gain. The estimates are small or negative, 
and the estimated standard errors are relatively large. A couple in which the 
male has a high level of education but the female does not receives the highest 
estimated return from migration for the household as a whole (about 55,000 
SEK); the male earnings growth of 59,000 SEK far exceeds the estimated 
female earnings reduction of more than 4,000 SEK. Again, the standard errors 
are rather large, and only the estimates of the male’s gains and total household 
earnings are statistically significant. 
 
Table 4 presents the results conditioned on a female having a university 
education. The estimated effect from migration on total household earnings is 
positive, regardless of the male’s education level, but it is only significant 
when both spouses have a high level of educational attainment. The female’s 
return is insignificant regardless of her husband’s education.  
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Table 4. Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of migration on 
gross wage earnings, conditional on the female having high 
education.  
  
 Females  Males  Household 
Outcome 
Male’s education  Male’s education  Male’s education 
Low  High  Low High Low High 
















































Number of couples 
Movers (off support)




Note: The estimates are based on the Normal kernel with bandwidth .005 and a common support 
restriction. The 5% of observations on migrants with the lowest propensity score density are 
removed. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
It seems that the education level of the husband is the primary determinant of 
the effect of migration on total household earnings. When both spouses have 
higher education, the total household gain from migration after four years is 
about 38,000 SEK, of which a major part is derived from the effect of the 
male’s earnings. 
 
A general impression from the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 is that the monetary 
benefit for a male with university education appears to be negatively correlated 
with the education level of his spouse. A highly-educated male living with a 
highly-educated female receives an increase in earnings that is substantially 
lower than for those living with lower-educated females (28,000 SEK as 
compared to 59,000 SEK four years after the move). For males and females 
with low education levels, the estimates indicate no statistically significant  Sex and Migration…  18
effects, and the education level of the spouse does not seem to affect the 
economic outcome of migration. 
 
Relative earnings within a household may be affected by the educational levels 
of the spouses. Table 5 gives the matching estimates of the effect on a female’s 
share of household earnings between 1997 and post-migration shares measured 
each year from 2000 to 2003.  
 
Table 5. Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of migration on the 
female’s share of total household gross wage earnings with  
Outcome  Females having low 
education 
Females having high 
education 
  Male’s education  Male’s education 

































































































Number of couples  









Note: The estimates are based on the Normal kernel with bandwidth .005 and a common support 
restriction. The 5% of observations on migrants with the lowest propensity score density are 
removed. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
When the sample is separated by education level, the signs of virtually all 
estimates are in line with the hypothesis that the relative education levels of 
spouses are indicators of bargaining power. However, the estimated effects 
pertaining to females with a lower level of education are insignificant. 
Substantial and statistically significant positive effects on a female’s share of Sex and Migration… 
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household earnings are indicated for the sample of highly-educated females 
married to lower-educated partners. For this sample, migration seems to 
increase the female share of total household earnings by around 4%. The 
estimated results for couples with highly-educated males and lower-educated 
females are negative but insignificant. This may seem puzzling, since the 
highly-educated male experiences the largest increase. The estimates for the 
total sample indicate no significant effects of migration on the female’s share 




V   Summary 
 
Our findings indicate that migration has a positive effect on total household 
gross wage earnings among married and cohabitating couples. The average 
effect is derived primarily from large earning increases among highly-educated 
males. The greatest income gains from migration are accrued by highly-
educated males married to or cohabiting with lower-educated females. In 
general, we find little evidence of positive effects of migration on earnings 
among females. Nevertheless, education level seems to be positively correlated 
with income gains among females, although the estimated effects are relatively 
small or statistically insignificant, even for highly-educated females. When 
examining the change in the female versus male shares of total household 
earnings, we find that the effect of migration is negligible. However, highly-
educated females coupled with lower-educated males experience a 4% increase 
in income share as compared to non-migrants.  
 
                                                 
16Results available upon request from the authors.  Sex and Migration…  20
Although not conclusive, we interpret our empirical findings in relation to the 
concept of tied migration as follows. The substantial gain in total income 
among migrating dual-income households implies that eventual negative 
income effects from tied migration are not large enough to fully offset the 
increases in household income caused by migration. Moreover, tied migration 
does not counteract potential income gains to an extent that incurs a decrease 
in income for either earner. This applies on average for the entire sample.  
 
Disaggregated analyses reveal that education levels affect the gains from 
migration in terms of individual earnings, total household earnings, and the 
female share of total earnings. The latter finding is, however, statistically and 
economically significant only for highly-educated females married or 
cohabitating with lower-educated males. For this group, the results support the 
hypothesis that relative education levels between spouses matters for 
bargaining power when household location decisions are made. Although 
general patterns of point estimates (that is, of earnings effects) for couples with 
other educational combinations support this hypothesis, statistical evidence 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Definitions of variables 
Individual attributes: 
Gross wage earnings 1997-2003; in hundreds of Swedish Kronor (SEK). 
Age; in 1997. 
Child(ren); couple has at least one child below the age of 18 living at home. 
Small children; couple only has children under the age of seven living at home.
Student; individual received study aid for higher education or adult education. 
Educational level; highest level of education attained by 1997. 
Sector; sector of work in 1997 according to the Industry code (sni92) as 
defined by Statistics Sweden. 
Welfare benefit; family received benefit in 1997. 




Access; total employment in adjacent labour market regions, weighted by 
distance between regional centres. 
Stockholm; couple lived in Stockholm county in 1997.  
South of Sweden; couple lived in Skåne or Blekinge county in 1997. 
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Table A2. Estimation results 
Variable  Logit estimation of 
migration in 1998 or 1999 
Regression on difference in total 















































































































Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. Male and female attributes are indicated with (M) and (F), 
respectively. 
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A positive association between spousal education and individual earnings is a 
common empirical finding (e.g., Benham, 1974 and Rossetti and Tanda, 2000). 
The two most common explanations for this are sample selection and cross-
productivity effects. Can spouses really benefit from each other’s human 
capital in the labour market, or does the entire association stem from 
assortative mating? In this study, we control for time-invariant heterogeneity 
that may be correlated with the spouse’s education level and use a rich data set 
that includes observations of individuals when they are single and when they 
are married. The results support the cross-productivity hypothesis for both 
males and females. Furthermore, couples with education within the same field 
experience even larger effects. 
 
Keywords: Marriage, Education, Human capital spillover. 
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1  Introduction 
 
A well-known finding in empirical labour economics is that married men 
enjoy higher earnings than do unmarried men (Ribar, 2004). For women, the 
effect of marriage on earnings is not as clear; e.g., Korenman and Neumark 
(1992) find negative effects of marriage on female earnings, but Waldfogel 
(1997) and others find positive effects. Another common finding is that an 
individual’s earnings are positively correlated with his/her spouse’s education 
level (for instance, Benham, 1974 or Tiefenthaler, 1997). This positive 
correlation may stem from marital matching - i.e., men/women who are more 
productive, all other things being equal, marry women/men with more 
education. Whether this correlation is due to selection into marriage or is an 
outcome of married life remains unresolved. In this paper, we will study if and 
how individual earnings are affected by the educational level and educational 
field of the spouse. Using longitudinal data including observations of 
individuals before and after becoming married, we estimate the within-
marriage interaction effect while controlling for the influence of marital 
matching. 
 
In the literature on the relationship between spousal education and individual 
earnings, a majority of the studies only analyse the effect of the wife’s 
education on the husband’s earnings. Benham (1974) estimates an ordinary 
least squares Mincer (1974) wage model and finds that each additional school 
year for the female increases her husband’s earnings by 3-4 percent. Using 
more recent data, Jepsen (2005) estimates a model similar to Benham’s but 
includes more controls; however, she also finds a positive association between 
the wife’s educational level and her husband’s earnings. For Iran, Scully 
(1979) finds similar results; each school year completed by the wife raises her 
husband’s earnings by 4 percent. Neuman and Ziderman (1992), using Israeli 
data from the 1970s, find that if the wife has graduated from high school, her The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings… 
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husband’s earnings increase by 9 percent. The relationship between a woman’s 
earnings and her husband’s education has not been studied to the same extent. 
Tiefenthaler (1994) finds a positive relationship between individual 
productivity and spousal education for both men and women in Brazil. Rossetti 
and Tanda (2000), using Italian data, find a positive relationship between the 
educational level of the spouse and earnings for both men and women. Huang 
et al., (2009) find a positive association between the husband’s education level 
and the wife’s earnings in China. 
 
Most of these studies rely on cross-sectional data, making it difficult to 
interpret the results. Men with higher earnings are more likely to get married; 
there is a positive selection into marriage. Additionally, highly educated 
individuals tend to marry other highly educated individuals, and high earners 
tend to marry each other (Mare, 1991; Smith, 1979; Lam, 1988 and Nakosteen 
et al., 2004). This implies that some of the correlation between a husband’s 
earnings and a wife’s education presumably comes from positive matching 
with regard to both education and earnings. 
 
The explanation that is most often proposed for the positive correlation 
between a wife’s education and her husband’s earnings is cross-productivity 
effects; spouses may benefit from each other’s human capital. An individual’s 
stock of human capital and productivity (and thereby of earnings) is affected 
by a number of factors besides education and formal training. These can, for 
instance, include upbringing or parents’ and friends’ behaviour and influences. 
According to Manski (2000), our surroundings can affect our behaviour 
through three different channels: restrictions, expectations and preferences. A 
few previous studies have tried to separate the selection effect from the 
possible effect of cross-productivity. Liu and Zhang (1999) use cross-sectional 
data and find a positive relationship between the wife’s education and the 





husband’s earnings equation, the coefficient of the individual’s education level 
is close to zero, and the estimated coefficient of the wife’s education is around 
10%. They argue that this pattern is hard to explain using the cross-
productivity hypothesis and that assortative mating is more important. Brynin 
and Francesconi (2004) use British panel data of married couples and find that 
the spouse’s education has a positive effect on own earnings. However, 
because  they do not observe the individuals when single and few individuals 
change their educational level after they get married, it is hard to distinguish 
the estimated effect from positive assortative mating. Huang et al., (2009) 
exploit survey data on Chinese twins to control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity that may be correlated with the spouse’s educational level. To 
further separate the mating effect from cross-productivity effects, they 
compare earnings at the time of the wedding and current earnings. They argue 
that at the time of the wedding, the possible cross-productivity effects should 
not have been realised yet. This implies that any estimated effects of spouses’ 
education on individual earnings at this time are due to assortative mating and 
not to cross-productivity. Their findings indicate a cross-productivity effect of 
the husband’s education on his wife’s earnings, but no effect of the wife’s 
education on her husband’s earnings. 
 
The contribution of this study lies to a large extent in the exploitation of 
longitudinal data collected over a period of time within which individuals 
experience both singlehood and marriage. This allows us to isolate the effect 
that arises within marriage from selection effects on the marriage market. We 
will employ a fixed effects model for earnings that accounts for unobservable 
time-invariant characteristics of the individuals. The next section briefly 
discusses how the educational attainment of a spouse may influence the 
earnings of his/her partner. Section three presents the data and section four the 
empirical model. The estimation results are reported in section five. The last 
section summarises the findings and concludes. The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings… 
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2  Education, marriage and earnings 
 
Given a set of exogenous conditions in the marriage market, the matching of 
spouses is assumed to be governed by utility maximisation. An individual 
chooses to enter a marriage if the expected utility of being married is greater 
than the expected utility of staying single. Becker (1973) suggests positive 
matching based on characteristics such as intelligence, appearance and 
education, and the gain from marriage is assumed to increase with these 
complementary attributes. The effect of education can, however, be ambiguous 
(Becker et al., 1977). A highly educated couple may experience higher returns, 
relatively speaking, from marriage because both spouses become more 
productive both domestically and in the labour market. At the same time, it 
may be the case that the spouses do not specialise fully and thereby miss out 
on greater returns. The possibility of specialising or helping each other in the 
labour market is likely to depend on the two individuals’ attributes and joint 
human capital. 
 
Being married to a partner with a high education level can affect individual 
earnings in a number of different ways. Higher education is likely to result in 
an increased ability to process information, improved cognitive skills and an 
enhanced capacity to cope with change. For instance, returns to schooling are 
affected by the individual's peer group in school (Summers and Wolfe, 1977; 
Sacerdote, 2001), and the productivity of workers is positively affected by the 
presence of other workers with high levels of education (Moretti, 2004). One's 
immediate surroundings, including a partner, can influence both consumption 
choices as well as behaviour on the labour market. A spouse, whom for many 
is the absolutely closest peer, might influence behaviour through common 
areas of responsibility - e.g., house, car and children. The restrictions are 
different for married individuals than for unmarried ones and are influenced by 





spouses/cohabitants are also likely to affect each other through values, 
attitudes and the ability/inability to expose each other to new ideas and 
opportunities. In development economics, it has been found that an illiterate 
adult earns significantly more when living in a household with at least one 
literate member (Basu et al., 2001). A spouse with a higher education level 
might possess a better capacity to give advice and share information that could 
benefit his/her partner’s career (Benham, 1974). It may be the case that a 
highly productive spouse counteracts the depreciation of the partner’s human 
capital. Yet another possible mechanism is network effects; this is an 
important part of job searching and has been proven in other contexts, such as 
students’ networks, to affect the likelihood of obtaining high-paying jobs 
(Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2002). 
 
The educational levels of the spouses also affect the bargaining situation in the 
family. Higher education is, according to Lundberg and Pollak (2003), 
associated with higher bargaining power. This implies that decisions in the 
family about, for instance, division of labor, fertility, consumption and where 
to live are likely to depend on the educational levels of the spouses. All of 
these different aspects of married life can influence an individual’s earnings. 
 
Education does not just have direct economic benefits, such as higher earnings 
and a lower probability of unemployment; it also affects the individual in other 
areas of life. Individuals with higher education tend to be in better health 
(Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2007), are 
more prone to engage in healthy behaviour and preventive care such as 
exercise and vaccination and are less likely to smoke (Cutler and Glaeser, 
2005). The lifestyle and health choices of one’s spouse may affect one’s own 
health and thereby one’s earnings. Having a spouse with a higher level of 
education is hence most likely associated with healthier behaviour, - e.g., less 
smoking and less excessive drinking (Monden et al., 2003) - and also with The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings… 
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lower mortality rates (Egeland et al., 2002). A high level of education also 
decreases the probability of engaging in criminal behaviour (Lochner and 




3   Data 
 
Two random samples of men and women, respectively, were drawn from a 
number of administrative registers kept by Statistics Sweden. The registers 
contain information on the entire Swedish population. The two samples pertain 
to ten percent of the men and women, respectively, who were married or 
cohabitating in 1997 and are set up as a panel consisting of yearly observations 
from 1990 to 2006. The individuals were born between 1946 and 1970 - i.e., 
they are between 20 and 60 years old. This yields samples of 89,622 males and 
96,780 females. To identify the effect of spousal education with fixed 
individual effects, there needs to be variation in the educational levels of the 
spouses. However, very few individuals change their educational levels after 
marriage. To ensure variation in the educational levels of the spouses, we 
restrict the sample to individuals who were single for at least one year during 
the observed period. This results in final samples of 43,153 males and 42,546 
females. If the individual was married in a certain year, the spouse's 
characteristics are assigned measured values for that year. For the years during 
which the individual was not married, the variables indicating the spouse’s 
characteristics are set to zero. No age restriction applies for the spouse. 
Cohabitation is very common and socially accepted in Sweden. In the official 
data, unmarried cohabitant couples are only registered if they have a child in 
common. This means that we cannot observe when the couples actually 





spousal education on earnings and not in the formation of the couple itself, this 
should not pose a major concern for our interpretation of the empirical results.
1  
 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the logarithm of total annual earnings 
from employment, deflated by the Swedish Consumer Price Index and 
measured at the price level of the year 2000. Annual earnings rather than 
wages must be used because the data do not include information about hours 
or weeks worked. This means that the estimated effects on earnings can be 
both wage effects and labour supply/hours effects. The explanatory variables
2 
account for differences in labour supply and demand. Children, parental leave, 
and student status are expected to control for labour supply, whereas variables 
indicating region of residence and employment sector account for differences 
in labour market characteristics that are related to both labour supply and 
demand. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present the sample means for females and males, respectively, 
conditioned on non-zero earnings and stratified by the educational level of the 
spouse. Comparing the sample means in columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 shows 
that women who are married to men with less than a university education are, 
on average, different from the women married to men with at least a university 
education. Women married to men with more education have higher average 
earnings. This may be explained partly by their higher levels of education; 
over 60 percent of the women with husbands who have university educations 
also have university educations themselves, whereas only around 24 percent of 
the females married to men with less than university educations are themselves 
university-educated. 
 
                                                 
1 If the individuals are in reality married but we observe them as single, this will lead to an 
attenuation bias of the effects of spousal education. 
2 Detailed definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix . The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings… 
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Table 1. Sample means of variables observed in 1997, females. 
Variable 
Married to male with less than 
university-level education 
Married to male with university-
level education or greater 
  Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. 
Years married  12.15 3.06 12.36 2.87 
Total annual earnings  
(SEK 100)  1213.18 790.87 1469.29  1059.33 
Own education       
Secondary school  0.61  0.33  
University  0.23  0.62  
Ph.D.  0.001   0.01   
Years of education  11.53 1.84 13.36 2.23 
Spouse’s education      
Secondary school  0.73     
University     0.95   
Ph.D.     0.05   
Years of education  10.39 1.84 14.92 1.15 
Same educational field      
Broad Field  0.18  0.28  
Narrow Field  0.11  0.12  
Age  35.94 6.78 36.23 6.49 
Children  0.83    0.82  
Parental benefits  0.60    0.61  
Unemployed  0.23    0.16  
Sector of employment        
Farming  0.008    0.005  
Manufacturing  0.12    0.09  
Construction  0.013    0.01  
Retail  0.20    0.14  
Private sector  0.11    0.16  
Public sector  0.52    0.56  
Region of residence        
Stockholm  0.20    0.31  
East Middle Sweden  0.17    0.15  
Smaland and the islands  0.09    0.06  
South Sweden  0.13    0.13  
West Sweden  0.20    0.19  
North Middle Sweden  0.11    0.07  
Middle Norrland  0.04    0.04  
Upper Norrland  0.06    0.05  





Furthermore, it can be seen that women married to men with more education 
have been married longer and are older; fewer are unemployed, and they are 
more likely to have children. The sample means also show that the couples in 
which the husband has attained a university-level education are more likely to 
be educated within the same field. One explanation for this might be that the 
spouses are more likely to have met during the course of their education or at 
work. Official Swedish data show that among the professions that have more 
equal gender divisions, the majority require some university education (SCB, 
2007). 
 
The sample means for males show a similar pattern, presented in Table 2. 
Males married to women with a university education enjoy higher earnings 
and have achieved a higher level of education than have males married to 
women with less than a university education. This observed pattern of a 
positive relationship between spouses’ education levels and individuals’ 
education levels is in accordance with expectations and previous studies. 
Becker (1974) argues that in an efficient marriage market, there should 
optimally be positive matching with regard to education. In 1997, the 
correlation in years of education between the spouses is 0.44 for the sample of 
females and 0.45 for the males. This makes it obvious that there is a positive 
relationship between earnings and spousal education due to the return to an 
individual's own education. 
 The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings… 
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Table 2. Sample means of variables observed in 1997, males. 
Variable  Married to female with less than 
university-level education 
Married to female with university-
level education or greater   
  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
Years  married  11.98 3.17 12.38 2.83 
Total annual earnings  
(SEK 100)  2 075.65  1206.75  2 702.32  2 142.95 
Own education       
Secondary  school  0.59  0.34  
University  0.19  0.55  
Ph.D. 0.003    0.03   
Years of education  11.21  2.33  14.70  2.53 
Spouse’s education      
Secondary  school 0.79     
University     0.99   
Ph.D.     0.01   
Years of education  10.57  1.89  14.70  0.87 
Same educational field      
Broad  Field  0.20  0.24  
Narrow  Field  0.13  0.11  
Age  36.39 6.59 37.31 6.53 
Children  0.86  0.83  
Parental  benefits  0.47  0.47  
Unemployed  0.15  0.10  
Sector  of  employment      
Farming  0.02  0.01  
Manufacturing  0.31  0.22  
Construction  0.12  0.07  
Retail  0.27  0.19  
Private  sector  0.12  0.21  
Public  sector  0.15  0.29  
Region  of  residence     
Stockholm  0.20  0.28  
East  Middle  Sweden  0.17  0.16  
Smaland and the islands  0.10    0.07   
South  Sweden  0.14  0.13  
West  Sweden  0.20  0.19  
North Middle Sweden  0.10    0.07   
Middle  Norrland  0.04  0.04  
Upper  Norrland  0.05  0.06  
Number of observations  24,445    12,153   





Does spousal education matter for individual earnings, then, when one’s own 
level of education is held constant? In Tables 3 and 4, the average annual 
earnings for men and women, respectively, are stratified by own and spouse’s 
educational levels. The sample means below show that individual earnings 
seem to be systematically related to the educational level of the spouse. For 
females with less than a university education, the average earnings do not seem 
to depend on the educational level of the spouse. The means for earnings are 
roughly the same for females with a secondary school-level education who are 
married to males with compulsory-level education or lower (1185.21) 
compared to females married to males with a university-level education 
(1216.95) or a Ph.D. (1175.91). When the females have attained a university- 
or PhD-level education, earnings are higher when the education level of the 
husband is higher. This may indicate that it takes a higher individual education 
level to be able to benefit from the spouse’s higher level of education. 
 
 
Table 3. Female’s earnings in 1997 conditioned on the husband’s educational 
level. 
 Own  education 
Husband’s 
education 
Compulsory Secondary  University  Ph.D. 
































Note: Number of observations within parentheses. The group “compulsory” includes individuals
with an educational attainment level of compulsory of lower. 
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Table 4. Male’s earnings in 1997 conditioned on the wife’s educational 
level. 
 Own  education 
Wife’s education  Compulsory  Secondary  University  Ph D 
































Note: Number of observations within parentheses. The group “Compulsory” includes individuals





























A similar pattern for men can be seen in Table 4. Given an individual’s 
education level, the earnings are higher when the education level of the wife is 
higher. This relationship holds for all combinations except that of males 
married to women with doctoral degrees. However, there is no basis for strong 
conclusions because these groups consist of very few observations. The raw 
correlations between one’s own earnings and spousal education, measured in 




4   Empirical Model 
 
It is likely that one’s own education level and one’s spouse’s education level 
are correlated with unobservable characteristics that influence earnings. The 
selection hypothesis actually implies that there is a correlation between the 
omitted unobservable characteristics that lead to higher earnings and the 
                                                 
3 Estimated for all years the individuals are married and have non-zero earnings. The estimated 
correlations are significantly different from zero.  





spouse’s educational level. To encompass this, we estimate the effects of 
spousal education using a fixed effects model: 
 
it t i it it it u M X Y ε η β β ϕ + + + ′ + ′ + = 2 1 ln  
 
Yit is individual i's earnings at time t, and Xit is a vector of explanatory variables 
for individual i at t. The vector M includes the marriage related variables that 
are the focus of our study. M contains controls for marital status and spouse’s 
educational level. Descriptive statistics indicate that the effect of spousal 
education might depend on the individual’s own education level. It is plausible 
that it takes a higher level of education to be able to benefit from the spouse’s 
higher education level, therefore an interaction variable between own 
educational level and spouses educational level is included. The possibility of 
two partners’ helping each other in the labour market is also likely to depend 
on the individuals’ fields of education. If there is a cross-productivity or 
network effect of spousal education, it should be bigger if the spouses share 
the same field of education. Dummy variables indicating if the two spouses' 
fields of education are the same are included to capture this. u i  is a time 
invariant individual effect. ηtt. represents time effects that are controlled for by 
time dummies. εit is the error term. 
 
 
5   Results 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the estimations of the effects of spousal 
education on individual earnings for men and women, respectively. For 
straightforward comparison with the results of previous studies, education is 
measured in years, and the first specification does not include any individual 
effects. Running the model with random effects (not presented here) yields a The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings… 
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Lagrange multiplier test that is highly significant, supporting the individual 
effects specifications. As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, the results of all 
Hausman tests are highly significant, rejecting the random effects models in 
favour of the fixed effects models. This further shows that the hypothesis of 
there being no correlation between the individual effect and the explanatory 
variables must be rejected.
4 The estimated coefficient of the Wife’s education 
in the earnings equation for males is positive and significant in the first 
specification - i.e., the education of his wife appears to have a positive effect 
on a man's own earnings. The estimated coefficient of 0.0174 is smaller than 
those found in previous studies, where the estimated coefficients vary between 
3 and 4 percent. 
 
This estimated association between one’s own earnings and spousal education 
may stem from both cross-productivity effects and the marital matching of 
high earning men to women with higher levels of education. The second 
specification takes into account time-invariant unobservable characteristics of 
the individual affecting his/her earnings that may be correlated with the 
spouse’s education. When including the fixed individual effects, the parameter 
estimate for Wife’s education is reduced but still significant. This indicates that 
part of the estimated effect in the first specification is likely to be due to 
selection into marriage. Men with higher earnings are more likely to marry 
women with high education - i.e., men who are more productive irrespective of 
marriage status (who are more productive whether they are single or married) 
tend to be married to women with higher education levels.  
 
                                                 
4The random effects model requires that the individual effects be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. A Hausman specification test evaluates the more efficient random effects model against 
a less efficient but always consistent fixed effects model to make sure that the efficient model also 
yields consistent results. After comparing the coefficients in the two models, one can accept or 
reject the random effects model. If the coefficients differ, the test rejects the random effects model 
in favour of the fixed effects specification. 





Table 5. Estimated effects of wife's education on earnings for males. 
  1 2 3 4 5 


































Interaction      
0.0013 
(0.0001) 






         
0.0285 
(0.0047) 
***   
Narrow field 




                 
Fixed  Effects  NO  YES YES YES YES 
Hausman    6955.34 6958.78 6999.87 6990.88 
R
2  0.296 0.277 0.277 0.276 0.276 
Number  of  obs. 515,660 515,660 515,660 515,660 515,660 
Note I: Included in all estimated models are variables indicating children, parental leave, 
unemployment, student status, sector of employment, region of residence, age, and yearly 
dummies. The estimated coefficients are available from the author. Note II: t-values in 
parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 10/5/1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
The positive and significant coefficient of Wife’s education yields support for 
the hypothesis of a positive cross-productivity effect and indicates that there 
may be a causal effect of the wife’s education level on the earnings of her 
husband.  
 
Specifications 3-5 include an interaction variable to capture interdependence 
between the spouses' educational levels. The estimated coefficient of Wife’s 
education changes sign and is now negative and significant, indicating that 
having a highly educated wife may lower a man's earnings. However, the 
coefficient of Educational interaction is positive and significant. This suggests 
that the combination of spouses' educational levels is crucial because of its 
positive effect on individual earnings. The earnings gain from being married to The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings… 
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The earnings gain from having a highly educated spouse can be an outcome of 
a higher level of general knowledge that affects lifestyle choices. It may also 
be due to the partner’s more specific knowledge and thereby his/her ability to 
help, support and provide networks that affect individual earnings in a more 
direct way. Relatively speaking, the general effect of education on health and 
lifestyle is likely to be closely associated with the spouse’s level of education. 
In contrast, a common field of education should have a larger impact on cross-
productivity. The possibility of providing direct help and specific knowledge is 
expected to be greater if the spouses each have a degree in the same field of 
education. Therefore, the earnings equation is extended by dummy variables 
for the spouses’ fields of education being the same. Two alternative indicators 
are used. One, Broad Field, is a more general category made up of nine 
different fields - e.g., social sciences, humanities and health care and welfare. 
The second variable, Narrow Field, is on a more detailed level - for instance, 




The estimated coefficient of the Broad Field is positive and significant, 
implying that being married to a female within the same field of education 
increases a man's earnings by almost 3 percent. The coefficient of the more 
specialised field, Narrow Field, is also positive and significant. For men, the 
                                                 
5To allow for the possibility that the effect of spousal education is non-linear, alternative 
specifications in which educational levels are indicated by dummy variables have been estimated. 
The coefficient for secondary-level education on the part of the wife is negative and significant, 
compared to when the wife is only educated up to the compulsory level, whereas the estimated 
parameters for University and Ph.D. are positive and significant. With the inclusion of interaction 
variables between the educational levels, the coefficients of spouses’ education are no longer 
significant. Among the interaction variables, only the combination “university and university” is 
positive and significant. 





estimated coefficient is 0.0451, which indicates that earnings are 4.5 percent 
higher if the wife is educated within the same field. The estimated effect of the 
narrow field is larger than the estimated effect of the broad field, which 
supports the idea of field-specific knowledge and cross-productivity effects. 
Table 6 gives the total effect of spousal education on earnings for males, which 
is calculated from the estimated coefficients in specification 4 in Table 5. The 
total effects are positive overall, and the effect increases throughout as the 
educational levels of the spouses increase.  
 
Table 6. Total effects of spousal education on earnings for males. 
 Own  education 
Wife’s education  Compulsory  Secondary  University  Ph.D. 


































The estimates of the earnings equations for females, presented in Table 7, 
show a pattern similar to that of the results for males. The first specification 
without fixed effects yields a positive and significant coefficient for the 
Husband’s education, indicating a positive effect of the spouse’s education on 
female earnings. The coefficient of Husband’s education decreases but is still 
significant when the time-invariant individual effects are included. This 
suggests that relatively more productive females, all other things equal, tend to 
marry men with higher education levels.
7 
                                                 
7 Specifications with dummy variables indicating educational level give positive and significant 
stimates for all levels of education above the compulsory level. These estimates remain positive 
and significant with the inclusion of interaction variables. Furthermore, there seem to be additional 
positive effects for women married to men with university degrees if the female herself has at least 
a university education. The Effects of Spousal Education on Individual Earnings… 
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Table 7. Estimated effects of husband’s education on earnings for females.  
  1 2 3 4 5 
Marital status  -0.2706 
(0.0084) 









Education   0.0715 
(0.0007) 









Husband’s education  0.0061 
(0.0007) 




















Broad field    
 
   0.0563
(0.0061)
***  
Narrow field    0.0719
(0.0066)
***
Fixed  Effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs.  569 229  569 229  569 229  569 229  569 229 
Hausman    4210.86 4276.86 4311.93 4309.68 
R
2  0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Note I: Included in all estimated models are variables indicating children, parental leave, 
unemployment, student status, employment sector, region of residence, age, and yearly 
dummies. The estimated coefficients are available from the author. Note II: t-values in 
parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 10/5/1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
In specification 3, the parameter for Educational interaction is positive and 
significant and the coefficient of Husband’s education changes sign and 
becomes significant. This indicates that being married to a male with a high 
level of education can have negative effects on individual earnings unless the 
female herself also has a high level of education.  
 
Both Broad Field and Narrow Field have positive and significant coefficients. 
A female married to a male within the same narrow field experiences an 
earnings increase of more than 7 percent compared to women married to males 
in a different field. Again, the coefficient of the Narrow Field is larger than the 
                                                                                                           





coefficient of the Broad Field,  indicating that there are larger cross-
productivity effects associated with more similar educational fields. 
 
In Table 8, we see the total effect of the husband’s education on earnings for 
females calculated from the estimated coefficients in specification 4 in Table 
7. It appears that the total effect of the husband’s education is negative for 
females with an education  below the university level.  
 
Table 8. Total effects of spousal education on earnings for females 
 Own  education 
Husband’s education  Compulsory Secondary  University  Ph.D. 

































Females with university educations seem to experience a gain in earnings 
regardless of the educational levels of their husbands. It is, however, important 
to remember that the coefficient of Marital Status
8 is -0.2071, such that the 
total effect of being married on earnings is negative. On the other hand, if the 
spouses are educated within the same field, the total effect is positive for 
women with a Ph.D.  
 
To check the stability of the results with regard to the variation in spouses’ 
educational levels and sampling restrictions, a robustness check was 
                                                 
8 Because the data only include individuals who eventually got married, it is not possible to 
interpret the coefficient of Marital Status as is conventionally done in the literature on marriage 
premium or marriage penalty. 
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performed. To be able to identify the effect of spousal education, it is 
necessary to observe the individuals as single or that there be a change in the 
spouses’ educational levels during the observation period. The hitherto-
presented results are based on a sample including individuals who were single 
for at least one year during the sampling period. In a robustness check, we 
included only individuals who were single for at least five years during the 
period of observation. The results for this sample are very close to those 
presented here. 
 
The results presented in Tables 5 through 8 are based on observations with 
non-zero earnings because we use the logarithm of earnings. Including 
observations with zero earnings and adding one before taking the logarithm 
does not change any of our results or interpretations above. Some observations 
of low income from labour may represent individuals mainly outside the 
labour force, which hypothetically may affect the results. Dropping all 




6  Summary and conclusion 
 
The results of this study indicate a positive effect of spousal education on 
individual earnings. This holds for both men and women. The positive 
significant effect remains when including fixed effects. This indicates that 
selection on time-invariant attributes alone cannot explain the entire observed 
association and that there seems to be some sort of spill over or cross-
productivity effect.  
 
Further, the results for both men and women show that the earnings gain from 





as the education of the spouse, i.e., the combination of educational levels. 
Having a husband with a high level of education may have a negative effect on 
the wife's earnings unless she has a higher level of education as well. 
Generally, the higher the level of an individual's education, the larger the gain 
of having a highly educated spouse. A possible explanation is that it takes a 
high level of education to be able to benefit from the productivity spill over 
effects from the partner.  
 
The cross-productivity interpretation of the empirical results is strengthened by 
the analysis of the spouses' fields of education. On top of the general effect of 
spousal educational level, the results indicate an additional effect if the fields 
of education are the same. The cross-productivity effect should be larger when 
individuals are educated within the same field because this provides greater 
opportunities for cross-productivity effects to appear and makes it easier for 
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Table A1. Definitions of variables. 
Variable name  Description 
Married  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is married in 
year t, zero otherwise. 
 
Years married  Number of years living as married. 
 




Education  The levels of schooling as indicated in the registers of 
Statistics Sweden are transformed into years of schooling in 
the following way: 7 years for old compulsory schooling, 9 
years for new compulsory schooling, 11 years for short 
upper-secondary school, 12 years for long upper-secondary 
school, 14 years for short university, 15.5 for long university 
and 19 years for a doctoral degree. 
 
Spouse’s education (in years)  Equal to the spouse’s years of education if the individual is 
married, zero otherwise. 
 
Broad Field  Equal to one if the individual is married and the spouses are 
educated within the same broad field, zero otherwise. 
 
Narrow Field  Equal to one if the individual is married and the spouses are 
educated within the same narrow field and zero otherwise. 
 
Children   Dummy variable equal to one if there are children under 18 
years old living in the household; zero otherwise. 
 
Parental benefits  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual receives any 
parental benefits; zero otherwise. Parental benefits are 
payable for 450 days for children born before 2002 to parents 
who stay out of work to look after a child. The parental 
benefit days are always shared equally between the two 
parents, but one parent may give up his/her parental benefits 
to the other parent. The amount that one receives is a function 
of one’s annual income.  
 
Self-employed  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is self 
employed; zero otherwise. 
 
Farming  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is employed in 
farming; zero otherwise. According to SNI-92. 
 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is employed in 
manufacturing; zero otherwise. According to SNI-92. 




Table A1 continued   
Variable name  Description 
Construction  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is employed in 
construction; zero otherwise. According to SNI-92. 
 
Retail  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is employed in 
retail; zero otherwise. According to SNI-92. 
 
Private sector  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is employed in 
the private service sector; zero otherwise. According to SNI-
92. 
 
Public sector  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is employed in 
the public sector; zero otherwise. According to SNI-92. 
 
Stockholm  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives in 
Stockholm; zero otherwise. According to NUTS 2. 
 
East Middle Sweden  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives in East 
Middle Sweden; zero otherwise. According to NUTS 2. 
 
Smaland  and  the  islands  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives in 
Smaland and the islands; zero otherwise. According to NUTS 
2. 
 
South Sweden  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives in South 
Sweden; zero otherwise. According to NUTS 2. 
 
West Sweden  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives in West 
Sweden; zero otherwise. According to NUTS 2. 
 
North Middle Sweden  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives in North 
Middle Sweden; zero otherwise. According to NUTS 2. 
 
Middle  Norrland  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives in 
Middle Norrland; zero otherwise. According to NUTS 2. 
 
Upper Norrland  Dummy variable equal to one if the individual lives in Upper 
Norrland; zero otherwise. According to NUTS 2. 
 






Table A2. Fields of education.   
Broad fields  Narrow fields 
General Programmes  Basic/broad, general programmes  
Literacy and numeracy  
Personal skills 
 
Education  Teacher training and education 
science 
Social Sciences, Business and Law  Social and behavioural sciences 
Journalism and information 
Business and administration 
Law 
 
Science, Mathematics and Computing  Life science 
Physical science  
Mathematics and statistics 
Computing 
 
Engineering, Manufacturing and 
Construction 
Engineering and engineering 
trades 
Manufacturing and processing 
Architecture and building 
 
Agriculture and Veterinary  Agriculture, forestry and fishery 
Veterinary 
 
Health and Welfare  Health 
Social services 
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This paper studies how the spouse’s productivity in the labor market affects 
one’s individual earnings when married. Theoretically, the high productivity of 
a spouse in a marriage could affect the other spouse’s earnings in two ways: 
negatively through specialization and division of labor, or positively from 
human capital spillover. Using longitudinal microdata on individuals as both 
single and married people allows us to estimate the spouses’ productivity as a 
single persons and thereby avoid problems of endogeneity between the two 
spouses’ labor market performances. Productivity is approximated with 
residuals from estimates of pre-marriage earnings equations. Results indicate 
that there are negative effects of the spouse’s productivity on individual 
earnings for both males and females, and that this effect appears to be 
enhanced by the duration of the marriage. However, closer examination shows 
that only the youngest groups of males and females experience this negative 
effect. In addition, there is some evidence for a positive effect of the husband’s 
productivity on earnings in the case of older groups of females. 
 
 
Keywords: Marriage, Assortative mating, Earnings, Specialization. 
 
JEL Classification: D10, J12. 
 
________________________________________ 
* I am grateful for comments from Per Johansson, Magnus Wikström, Kurt Brännäs, Olle 
Westerlund and participants at seminars at Umeå University and Swedish Institute for Social 





Specialization and division of labor between husbands and wives are common 
explanations of monetary gains realized from marriage. According to 
economic theory, the reasons for this are that there are differences in the 
comparative productivity of the spouses and that the productivities of the 
spouses act as substitutes. An alternative to the specialization hypothesis is that 
the productivity of one spouse will increase the other spouse’s human capital 
and productivity. The spouses can assist each other in the labor market, and 
their productivities may be complements. In this paper, we will study how the 
spouse’s productivity, as manifested in earnings in the labor market, affects 
one’s own individual earnings. Will marrying someone who is successful in 
the labor market have a different effect on one’s earnings than marrying 
someone less successful? 
 
Marital matching has implications for the income distribution in society as a 
whole and plays a significant role in the persistence of economic status across 
generations (Chadwick and Solon, 2002). The matching of individuals may 
also have an effect on the distribution of incomes within a marriage as well as 
between males and females. 
 
The degree of specialization depends on the market and domestic productivity 
of the spouses. Both the hours and effort directed towards market and domestic 
work are potentially outcomes of a bargaining and specialization process. Most 
previous studies typically rely on data on earnings and labor force attachment 
during marriage when studying specialization and the division of labor. 
Examples of the questions pursued are, how the earnings of the husband affect 
the wife’s transitions in and out of work (Henz and Sundström, 2001) and the 
amount of time the wife spends at work affects the husband’s earnings (Chun 




the spouse is measured during marriage, it may represent an outcome of the 
specialization process and not a determinant. Findings in previous studies 
indicate that individuals tend to marry as well as be married to others who are 
similar to themselves in terms of earnings and education. (Smith, 1979; Lam, 
1988, and Nakosteen et al., 2004). The former is assortative mating, i.e., the 
matching process of individuals into marriage, where high earners choose to 
marry other high earners. The latter is an outcome of interaction processes 
within a marriage. The question that arises is: If individuals marry others with 
similar earnings potential, will the two spouses reinforce or offset each other as 
a married couple? A test of this requires information on the spouses’ 
productivities before they marry. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is that we are able to control for the 
attributes and labor market performance of individuals before they marry, i.e., 
before the potential specialization process has begun. We will use a rich 
register data set, including yearly observations on the entire Swedish 
population over time. This longitudinal data makes it possible to observe the 
individuals and their spouses when they are single and also later on, when they 
are married. The premarital productivity of the spouse will be approximated by 
the differences between the spouse’s actual earnings and the expected 
earnings, given a cross-sectional earnings regression based on observations 
from three years before the marriage. By using information on the individuals 
before they actually meet and form couples, we avoid the problem of 
endogeneity between the spouses’ labor market performance and earnings. 
 
Family life in Sweden, as in most developed countries, has, in the last few 
decades, undergone substantial change, and today women participate in the 
labor market al.,most to the same extent as men.
1 The increase in female labor 
                                                 
1 In 2003, 78 percent of all women 20-64 years old were in the labor force, compared to 82 percent 
of all men (Statistics Sweden, Labor force Survey LFS). The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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force participation is an international phenomenon, but, for comparison, 
Sweden has among the highest female labor force participation rates in the 
world.
2 The high share of dual-earner households and the availability of rich 
longitudinal microdata makes Sweden an interesting case to study how the 
choice of partner, i.e., how the partner’s premarital productivity (earnings), 
affects labor market outcomes for both men and women. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section 
presents some theoretical considerations, and Section 3 reviews previous 
studies on marital matching and specialization within marriage. Sections 4 and 
5 present the empirical model and data. The results are reported in Section 6, 
and Section 7 summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
 
2  Marital Matching and Gains from Marriage 
 
Gains from marriage are in the literature typically attributed to specialization 
and division of labor within a marriage (Becker, 1981). This is based on 
assumptions that rely on differences in productivity and comparative 
advantage. A higher productivity of the spouse in the labor market (ceteris 
paribus) indicates greater advantages of specialization and the division of labor 
as a result of comparative advantage. The degree of specialization depends on 
the spouses’ relative human capital and also on their preferences. As the 
couple begins to specialize, the benefits of specialization will increase, as they 
acquire more specific skills. Becker (1985) shows specialization can occur 
without affecting the working hours of the husband and wife. Housework and 
childcare are tiring compared to leisure and may lead to the individual with 
more housework responsibilities taking less demanding market work, which 
                                                 
2 According to OECD statistics, only Iceland had a higher female labor force participation rate in 




would lead to lower earnings. If the characteristics of the male and female are 
substitutes in the household production function, and if the gains from 
specialization are greater when the difference in the productivity of the spouses 
is greater, then negative assortative mating will be optimal. A marriage market 
that maximizes the sum of marital output will match people with differing 
attributes. With respect to wages, Becker (1973) argues that negative matching 
is optimal. In other words, individuals with high labor market productivity will 
marry individuals with low labor market productivity. 
 
Another possible source of gains from marriage is the sharing of household 
public goods
3. Household public goods are jointly consumed by the spouses 
and can, for instance, be children, nice living spaces, heating, lighting, neat 
gardens and road trips. Lam (1988) extends Becker’s model to include the joint 
consumption of public goods. In Lams model, the gains from marriage come 
from both the joint consumption of household public goods and possibly also 
specialization. If the spouses’ wage elasticity of demand for the household 
public good has the same sign, positive assortative mating with respect to 
earnings is optimal. However, if these goods can be produced at home, gains 
from specialization can be realized and may result in negative assortative 
mating in the optimum. The size of these two effects depends on the 
elasticities of demand for the public good, the cross-wage elasticities of labor 
supply and the level of demand of the public good. If the gains from the 
family’s consumption of the public good offset the gains from specialization, 
the model predicts that high earners will marry each other. Nonetheless, in this 
model, division of labor will still occur, the spouse with higher wage will 
specialize in market work and the spouse with lower wage will specialize in 
home production. Positive assortative mating will be optimal as long as the 
                                                 
3 Other possible monetary gains to marriage are risk sharing and the coordination of investment 
activities (Weiss, 1997). The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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gain from sharing the public good is greater than the comparative advantage 
effect that would occur under negative assortative mating. 
 
An alternative hypothesis is that both spouses can augment the other’s 
productivity. In the workplace, the high productivity of one worker has been 
shown to have a positive effect on the productivity of his/her co-workers (Mas 
and Moretti, 2009). The productivity of the spouses may be complements in 
the labor market, and one or both spouses may be able to benefit from the 
other’s human capital and productivity (See, e.g., Brynin and Francesconi 
2004). Marrying someone who is successful in the labor market may benefit 
one’s own career and increase one’s own earnings. Possible mechanisms for 
this are, e.g., access to larger and more productive networks, the drive and 
ambition of one spouse’s inspiring the other spouse with regard to his/her 
career. Married spouses are also likely to affect each other through values, 
attitudes and the ability/disability to provide inspiration for new ideas and 
opportunities (Benham, 1974). Moreover, it might be the case that a highly 
productive spouse counteracts the depreciation of the partner’s human capital. 
 
 
3 Previous  studies 
 
A number of papers examine the economic processes within marriage, the 
division of labor and specialization within marriage. One strand is the 
literature on the marriage premium, which analyzes whether the positive effect 
on male earnings from marriage arises due to selection or due to specialization. 
The results are mixed; Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) find that the gain from 
marriage is no longer significant when accounting for the selection into 
marriage using an endogenous switching model. Chun and Lee (2001) also use 
switching regression, predicting marital status using the mother’s country of 




selection hypotheses. Korenman and Neumark (1991) use longitudinal data 
and show that the selection effect alone cannot explain the entire gain from 
marriage. More than half of the marriage premium remains after controlling 
for time-invariant unobservable individual attributes that affect both wages and 
marriage. Korenman and Neumark (1991) also show that the marriage 
premium is particularly large during the first five years of marriage. Bardesi 
and Taylor (2008) find large effects of selection on both observable and 
unobservable characteristics in estimates of a fixed-effects model. However, 
after including the time-invariant individual effects, they also find some 
evidence that supports the specialization hypothesis. Ginther et al., (2008) use 
a natural experiment, a reform in the widow pension system, to disentangle the 
marriage premium in Sweden. Their results indicate that the male marriage 
premium can be explained by positive selection into marriage. 
 
For women, the results are more varied. Korenman and Neumark (1992) 
estimate both instrumental variables and fixed-effects models and find that 
marriage does not seem to affect female wages. Hewitt et al., (2002) use 
quantile regression and find no effect of marriage on female wages. Budig and 
England (2001) estimate fixed-effects models and report negative effects on 
female wages. Using a similar approach, Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2004) 
report positive results only for older women. For Swedish women, Ginther et 
al., (2008) find a marriage penalty that the authors argue is due to 
specialization. 
 
If there is an effect of marriage on male and female earnings, it is likely to 
depend on who one marries. In numerous studies, the characteristics of the 
spouse are found to affect individual earnings. The amount of time the wife 
spends at home and the wife’s education are two examples. The educational 
level of the spouse is found to have a positive effect on individual earnings; the 
explanations most often proposed are network effects or human capital The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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spillover. Among others, the results in Benham (1974) and Jepsen (2005) 
indicate that a higher education of a wife increases her husband’s earnings. 
Rossetti and Tanda (2000), Groothius and Gabriel (2008) and Åström (2009) 
study the relationship between the spouse’s educational level and own earnings 
for both men and women and find positive effects on earnings. 
 
Some studies uses the wife’s labor force attachment, i.e., working hours, as a 
measure of the division of labor and study the effects on the husband’s 
earnings and thereby the degree of specialization. The labor supply and 
earnings during marriage may be affected by the division of labor within the 
couple, the behavior of the partner and the circumstances that characterize life 
as married as well as other exogenous factors that affect both spouses’ 
earnings. Clearly, the wife’s labor hours are endogenous to the husband’s 
earnings.  
 
A common solution to this problem is the use of instrumental variables. 
Instruments proposed include the wife’s characteristics and children (Daniel, 
1992) and the male’s attitude to gender roles and children (Gray, 1997). Both 
of these studies find a negative effect of the wife’s labor hours on the 
husband’s earnings. Another strategy is to use the prediction of the wife’s 
working hours as an instrument, where the wife’s working hours are predicted 
with variables that are assumed to be exogenous to the husband’s earnings. 
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) employ this strategy and use children, the age of 
the youngest child, the age of the wife, and the wife's level of education as 
exogenous variables. They find no or little effect of the wife’s working hours 
on the husband’s earnings. However, the presence of children and the age of 
the children may have a direct effect on the husband’s earnings, i.e., they 
might not be exogenous (see, e.g., Cornwell and Rupert, 1997). Chun and Lee 
(2001) use the presence of relatives in the household and the proportion of 




wife’s working hours. Their results are consistent with the specialization 
hypotheses. These studies all use the wife’s attributes within marriage and try 
in different ways to model the endogeneity of the wife’s labor supply, and the 
results rely on the validity of the instruments. The results in these previous 
studies are inconclusive regarding the occurrence of specialization within 
marriage. In the present study, an alternative strategy is used; we use a 
measure of the spouse’s productivity that is observed before the potential 
specialization process has begun. 
 
A few studies have used a similar approach of estimating the individuals’ 
productivity. Brynin and Francesconi (2004) calculate the partner’s, for both 
men and women, “unmeasured productivity” using the residuals from the 
couple’s “education-matching” equation. The unmeasured productivity of the 
individual is approximated with the difference between the partner’s actual and 
expected schooling, given a set of individual characteristics such as one’s own 
education and family background. Brynin and Francesconi find a positive and 
significant effect on the individual’s wage from the partner’s unmeasured 
human capital. Their interpretation is that these unmeasured parts of the 
partner’s human capital enhance the individual’s own stock of human capital 
and thereby his/her wage. The data used only cover the individuals as couples, 
which makes it difficult to separate the estimated effect from selection effects. 
Behrman et al., (1995) also estimate the individual’s unobserved human capital 
for subsequent implementation as a regressor in an earnings equation. They 
calculate the male’s unobservable human capital as the difference between his 
wife’s actual schooling, age and dowry, and her expected schooling, age and 
dowry given the man’s characteristics. This unobserved human capital is used 
as an explanatory variable in his earnings equation, and the results indicate a 
positive and significant effect. The authors argue that the result shows that 
potential wives and employers value the same, for the researcher, unobservable 
attributes. The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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To sum up, Becker (1973) argues that an optimal matching of individuals on 
the marriage market is achieved if individuals who are highly productive in the 
labor market marry individuals who are highly productive in domestic work. 
This implies that the labor productivity of the spouse will negatively affect the 
individual’s earnings. However, most empirical studies find that people marry 
or are married to individuals with similar economic attributes; i.e., they engage 
in positive assortative mating. There are also some studies that show that the 
labor market behavior and human capital of one spouse affects the other’s 
earnings. An alternative to the specialization hypothesis is that the productivity 
of one’s spouse in the labor market will increase one’s own human capital and 
productivity. The spouses can assist each other in the labor market, and the 
spouses’ productivity levels may be complements. 
 
 
4 Empirical  strategy 
 
The earnings of an individual can be viewed as an approximation of 
productivity and a measure of human capital. Schooling, age and labor market 
characteristics are some of the factors that are reflected in earnings. Individuals 
marry others of a similar age and with similar education levels, which implies 
that the earnings of husbands’ and wives’ in married couples are likely to be 
correlated. The parts of the spouse’s earnings that are attributed to these and 
other measured factors will be controlled for. In this study, the focus will be on 
how the unexplained part of the spouse’s earnings, i.e., the difference between 
expected and actual earnings, affects one’s own earnings. Having higher 
unexplained earnings implies that the individual is more efficient at exploiting 
his observed characteristics. The unmeasured factors can, for instance, be 
ambition, endurance, social skills, health, intelligence and beauty. Hereafter, 




productivity” or the “spouse’s premarital productivity”
 4. Previous studies that 
use the residuals from a Mincer-equation as a measure of an individual’s 
productivity and ability include Juhn et al., (1993) and Beenstock (2007). At 
least part of these attributes is visible to the potential partners, and previous 
studies show that the characteristics that are attractive to the employer also are 
attractive to potential spouses (Ribar, 2004 and Behrman et al., 1995). Several 
studies on marital matching consider the correlation in earnings residuals as a 
measure of assortative mating (Becker,1981; Nakosteen et al., 2004 and Smith, 
1979). 
 
A crucial feature of this study is that the spouse’s productivity is estimated 
using observations when the individuals are single, i.e., before the two 
individuals form a couple. The earnings during marriage may be affected by 
the division of labor within the couple, the behavior of the partner and of 
circumstances that characterize married life and other exogenous factors that 
affect both spouses’ earnings. In other words; if the spouse’s unexplained 
earnings and productivity are measured during the marriage, they will be 
endogenous to the individual’s own earnings, since both attributes are decided 
simultaneously within the marriage. Productivity observed prior to the 
marriage should not be affected by the "to be" spouse’s attributes or by the 
couple formation itself. To achieve an approximation of the spouse’s 
premarital productivity, we estimate cross-section earnings equations prior to 
the marriage for males and females, respectively. 
 
s s s s Y ε δ α + + ′ + = x β ln                                                                     [ Eq. 1] 
 
                                                 
4 This is a somewhat inadequate term and is rather a reflection of characteristics, unobservable to 
the researcher, that are hypothetically correlated with the productivity. The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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where β is a vector of unknown coefficients and xs are explanatory variables 
that according to theory and empirical research are assumed to influence the 
individual’s earnings. δs are the spouse's attributes that affect earnings and are 
unobservable to the researcher but are visible to the employer and the potential 
spouse. εs is the error term. The spouse’s productivity that will be used in step 
two is a generated regressor,  s δ ˆ , and will be approximated with the difference 
between the actual earnings and the expected earnings given the observed 
characteristics and the estimated coefficients from Equation 1. 
 
s s s Y x β′ − = ˆ ln ˆ δ  
 
In a second step, we examine whether the spouse’s premarital productivity is 
systematically correlated with the earnings of the individual in the subsequent 
years as married/cohabitants. The model to be estimated is 
 
it t i it is it is it it it it u D M M M Y ε γ δ β δ β β ϕ + + + + + + + = ˆ ˆ ' ln 4 3 2 1 x β ,                          [Eq. 2] 
 
where  Yit  are the individual’s i:s earnings at time t,  Xit  is a vector of 
explanatory variables for individual i  at t.  β1 is a vector of unknown 
coefficients. Mit is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual is married 
at time t and zero otherwise.  is δˆ
 is individual i’s spouse’s productivity prior to 
marriage, estimated in the first step. The effect of spousal premarital 
productivity is expected to depend on the length of the marriage. The variable, 
Dit, indicating the years of marriage at t, is included as an interaction variable 
with spouse’s premarital productivity to capture this potential effect. β2-4 are 
parameters to be estimated. If specialization occurs, we expect the estimated 
parameters of β3 and β4 to be negative. Given a negative sign on β3, a negative 




of the marriage as the spouse acquires more and more specific skills. On the 
other hand, positive signs on β3  and  β4 would indicate the opposite; the 
spouse’s productivity has a positive effect on the individual’s earnings, and the 
positive effect is enhanced with the duration of the marriage. This potential 
result would indicate positive externalities from the spouse’s human capital. ui 
is a time-invariant individual effect that accounts for the individual’s own 
unobservable characteristics affecting productivity, such as intelligence and 
ability. Equation 2 is estimated using a fixed-effects model to account for 
unobservable time-invariant individual heterogeneity.  t γ  is a time-specific 
effect, and  εit is the error term.
5 The variance in the second step will be 
estimated using the Murphy-Topel
6 estimator to account for the spouse’s 






The data used in this study have been constructed from administrative registers 
kept by Statistics Sweden. Our sample includes individuals born between 1943 
and 1969, who either got married or became cohabitants in 1997. This means 
that the individuals are at least 25 years old when the productivity is estimated 
in 1994. Cohabitating and having children without being married are very 
common and are socially accepted in Sweden.
7 In our data, unmarried 
cohabitant couples are only registered if they have a child in common. The 
empirical strategy in this study relies on the fact that the individuals are 
unmarried when the premarital productivity is measured; therefore, only 
                                                 
5 For an introduction to panel data models see, e.g., Baltagi (2001) and Greene (2003). 
6 See Murphy and Topel (1985). How to incorporate the estimator to Stata software can be found 
in Hole (2006) and Hardin (2002). 
7 “Marriage” will throughout the study be used synonymously with both formal marriage and 
cohabitation.  The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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couples where both spouses were single for the three years preceding the 
marriage are included. This gives a sample of 18,922 couples that were formed 
in 1997. Data is organized as a panel consisting of yearly observations from 
1994 to 2003, i.e., three years prior to marriage and up to the first seven years 
of marriage. 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total annual earnings from 
employment and self-employment. Annual earnings rather than wage must be 
used, as the data do not include information about hours or weeks worked. The 
earnings are deflated using the Swedish Consumer Price Index and are 
expressed in constant year-2000 SEK. The independent variables include 
individual attributes; age, education
8, dummies indicating student status, self-
employment, sector of employment and children present in the household. Age 
and age square are included to control for experience and life cycle effects that 
affect earnings. Education is a measure of the individual’s highest educational 
attainment according to official registers. The dummies indicating the region 
of residence account for regional differences affecting earnings, e.g., labor 
market conditions and commuting options. A dummy indicating students is 
included as an additional control for labor supply. A set of dummy variables 
indicating the sector of employment is included to control for sectorial 
differences in the labor market. Marriage and cohabitation are closely related 
to having children; consequently, indicators for children and parental leave
9 
are included in the set of explanatory variables. Parenthood has been shown to 
                                                 
8 The levels of schooling as indicated in the registers of Statistics Sweden are transformed into 
years of schooling in the following way: 7 years for the old compulsory school, 9 years for the 
new compulsory school, 11 years for short upper-secondary school, 12 years for long upper-
secondary school, 14 years for short university, 15.5 for long university and 19 years for a doctoral 
degree.  
9 Parental benefit is payable for 450 days for children born before 2002 for parents who stay away 
from work to be with a child. Both parents have equal entitlement to the parental benefit days, but 
one parent may give up part of their parental benefit to the other parent. The amount received is a 




have an effect on both male (Cornwell and Rupert, 1997) and female (Budig 
and England, 2001) earnings. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for females and males in 1994 and 1997. 
Females Males 
1994 1997 1994 1997 
Variable  Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev.
Total annual earnings 
(SEK 100)  1327.20 725.62 1266.29 946.71 1807.60 1291.23 2262.3 1455.65
Age  31.28 6.17 34.25 6.14 33.31 6.75 36.22 6.72 
Education (in years)  12.42 1.99 12.50 2.20 12.41 2.15 12.28 2.41 
Children  0.26  0.69  0.04  0.69  
Parental benefit  0.18  0.57  0.08  0.46  
Born in Sweden  0.91  0.91  0.92  0.92  
Self employed  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.04  
Student  0.13  0.06  0.07  0.04  
Farming  0.006  0.005   0.02    0.01   
Manufacturing  0.11  0.11  0.24  0.24  
Construction  0.01  0.01  0.11  0.10  
Retail  0.21  0.19  0.25  0.25  
Private sector  0.14  0.15  0.15  0.17  
Public sector  0.53  0.50  0.23  0.21  
Stockholm  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.28  
East Middle Sweden  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.15  
Smaland and the islands  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.06  
South Sweden  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  
West Sweden  0.19  0.19  0.20  0.19  
North Middle Sweden  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  
Middle Norrland  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  
Upper Norrland  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  
      
Number of obs.  16,986  16,447  16, 678  16,762 
 
Sample descriptives for males and females with nonzero earnings in 1994 (the 
year in which the premarital productivity is estimated) and 1997 (the first year 
of marriage) can be seen in Table 1. Comparing the means before marriage to 
the means in 1997 for females show that women have lower earnings when 
they are married compared to when they are single. This can partly be 
explained by the incidence of women staying home with young children. In The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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1997, 57 percent of the women collect parental benefits compared to 18 
percent in 1994. The mean of earnings for the males demonstrate an opposite 
pattern; their earnings are higher when they are married compared to when 
they are single. This could possibly be a sign of the well-documented marriage 
premium; for a review on the marriage premium literature, see Ribar (2004). 
Noteworthy is that even though almost 50 percent of the males collect parental 
benefits in 1997, compared to only 8 percent in 1994, their earnings are still 





The first step is to estimate the labor productivity of the spouses before 
marriage. The estimates of Equation 1 are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The estimated residuals from the earnings equations for males and females are 
positively correlated (not reported in the table). In 1994 the correlation in 
earnings residuals between males and females is 0.0854
10 for the entire sample. 
This indicates that high earners tend to marry other high earners, i.e., the data 
show signs of positive assortative mating for earnings. The results of the 
second-step estimations are presented in the Tables 2 and 3. The Hausman 
specification tests are all highly significant in favor of the fixed-effects models 
over specifications with random effects. 
 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 only include controls for education, region of 
residence and age. The estimated coefficient of Husband’s premarital 
productivity is negative and significant. This indicates that higher levels of 
                                                 
10 Nakosteen et al., (2004) also use Swedish data and estimates correlation in earnings residuals 
before marriage. They find a correlation of 0.09 three years prior to marriage for a sample of 




earnings generated by the husband, given his observable characteristics before 
marriage, lead to lower earnings generated by the wife during marriage. 
 
 
Table 2. Estimates of the earnings equations for females. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Married  -0.534 
(0.007) 


























Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-employed 
No No Yes  Yes 
Children and parental leave.  No No No Yes 
      
Hausman 900.78  929.87  1934.75  1710.32 
Adj R
2  0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36 
Number of observations  153,899 153,899 153,899 153,899 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
If the premarital productivity of the husband is one percent higher, ceteris 
paribus, the female’s earnings will be 3.7 percent lower as married. The theory 
of household specialization implies that the specialization should increase over 
time as the partners acquire more specific skills. In model 2, the interaction 
effect between the husband’s productivity and the length of the marriage is 
accounted for, and the estimated coefficient is negative and significant. A 
greater amount of time spent by the couple as a married couple leads to a 
larger negative effect of the husband’s premarital productivity on the female’s 
earnings. 
 
Model 3 includes control variables for the sector of employment, one’s status 
as a student and self-employment. These variables are related to the 
individual’s labor market attachment and may be affected by the marriage or The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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the partner’s characteristics. The estimated coefficients of Husband’s 
productivity and Husband’s productivity*Years married are still negative and 
significant. Model 4 includes indicators for children in the household and 
parental leave. This reduces the coefficients of Husband’s productivity and of 
the interaction with Years married. This indicates that part of the estimated 
effects in models 1-3 comes from the effect of having children or from that of 
being on parental leave. However, the estimated coefficients are still negative, 
and the coefficient of Husband’s productivity*Years married is significant. 
These estimates imply that there might not be an immediate effect of the 
husband’s premarital productivity; rather, the negative effect evolves over 
years of marriage. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of the earnings equations for males. 




























Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-employed  No No  Yes  Yes 
Children and parental leave.  No No  No  Yes 
          
Hausman 818.49  962.38  2656.75  2538.2 
Adj R
2 0.54  0.54  0.55  0.55 
Number of observations  158,897  158,897  158,897  158,897 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Table 3 gives the estimated coefficients for the males. In model 1, the 
estimated coefficient of the Wife’s premarital productivity in 1994 is negative 
and significant. This suggests that the higher level of unexplained earnings 
generated by the wife before marriage implies lower earnings generated by the 




marriage lowers the husband’s earnings by 1.2 percent. Model 2 includes an 
interaction between the wife’s productivity before marriage and the length of 
marriage in years. The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable is 
negative and significant. This implies that the negative effect of the wife’s 
productivity becomes stronger with the duration of the marriage
11. In models 3 
and 4, which include more control variables, the coefficients of Wife’s 
productivity are still negative but are now only significant at the ten percent 
level. 
 
The dynamics within marriage and the division of labor might differ with 
regard to the spouses’ age. It could possibly depend on different preferences 
between cohorts, life cycle effects such as labor force participation and 
employment. Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2004) find that there are gains to 
delaying marriage for women; women who marry later have higher wages. 
They further show that the timing of marriage does not seem to affect the 
wages of men. To analyze the heterogeneity with respect to different positions 
in the life cycle, we have estimated the effect of spousal productivity for 
different age groups. The sample is partitioned by the individual’s age in 1994 
into three groups, and the estimations include the full set of independent 
variables.
12 The premarital productivity of the spouse is, however, based on 
specifications including the entire sample. 
 
Table 4 presents the results for females. The estimated coefficients for the 
youngest group of women, aged 25-34, shows a similar pattern as the results 
presented in Table 2. The coefficient of Husband’s productivity is negative and 
significant in both models. The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable 
                                                 
11Alternative specifications including controls for the spouse’s characteristics (education, age, 
sector and self-employment) are associated with only marginal changes in results. 
12 The results are robust with respect to using the alternative approach of dividing the sample into 
five-year cohorts. The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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with years married is also negative, and the parameter estimate is twice as 
large as the estimate for the entire sample. 
 
 
Table 4. Estimates of the earnings equations for females, conditional on age
group. 
Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 































   -0.008
(0.002)
***    0.005 
(0.004) 
     0.019
(0.005)
***
Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-
employed 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Children and Parental 
leave. 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Hausman  1499.91 1537.84  225.69  226.72  155.06  152.98 
Adj R
2  0.34 0.34  0.45 0.45 0.56 0.56 
Number of obs.  119,132 26,467  8,300 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Women aged 35-44 do not seem to be affected by the premarital productivity 
of their husband. The estimated coefficient of Husband’s productivity is not 
significant; neither is the interaction with Years married. Results for women 
over 45 years old show a different pattern; the coefficient of Husband’s 
productivity is now positive and significant. This suggests that for this group 
of women, higher earnings of the husband before marriage is associated with 
higher earnings of the wife during marriage. When including the interaction 
variable, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that 
the positive effect increases over the years. A possible interpretation is labor 
augmentation. 




Table 5. Estimates of the earnings equations for males, conditional on age
group. 
Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Married  -0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.008 









Wife’s productivity  -0.014 
(0.004) 
*** -0.006 










married     
-0.002 
(0.001) 




Sector of employment,  
Student and Self-
employed 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Children and Parental 
leave.  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Hausman  1541.70 1544.98  614.94  442.52  309.25  281.58 
Adj R
2 0.53  0.53  0.58  0.58  0.62  0.62 
Number of obs.  105,872  38,197  14,828 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Table 5 gives the results for males conditioned on age group. For the youngest 
group of men aged 25-34, the estimated coefficients of Wife’s productivity and 
Wife’s productivity*Years married are very close to the estimates for the entire 
sample (Table 3). The estimated parameters for the two older age groups are 




Two additional robustness checks will be carried out. First, the results will be 
tested with regard to the year of estimating the spouse’s premarital 
productivity. Hitherto, the premarital productivity is estimated using 
observations in 1994, i.e., three years preceding the marriage. In an alternative 
specification, the premarital productivity is instead calculated in 1995. See 
Table A2 for estimation results for equation 1 using observations from 1995.  
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The results from using the spouse’s estimated premarital productivity in 1995 
are presented in Tables A3-A6 in the Appendix. Table A3 gives the estimated 
parameters for the entire sample of females, and the results are similar to those 
presented in Table 2 above. On average, there seems to be a negative effect 
from the husband’s productivity on the female’s earnings. Stratifying the 
sample by age group (Table A4) gives estimates in accordance with the 
previous results. Only the youngest group of women seems to experience a 
negative effect from the premarital productivity of the husband. Furthermore, 
the estimated coefficient of the husband’s productivity for the oldest group of 
women is positive and significant, implying that there may be a positive effect. 
 
The estimated effect of the wife’s productivity in 1995 on the male’s earnings, 
presented in Table A5, is similar to the results in Table 3. The coefficients of 
the  Wife’s productivity 1995*Years married are negative and significant. 
However, when adding more control variables, the coefficients of Wife’s 
productivity 1995 become insignificant. The results conditioned on the males’ 
age are also comparable to those above; the negative coefficient of Wife’s 
productivity is only significant for the youngest age group. 
 
It is not possible to observe cohabiting couples without children in common in 
our data. This means that we may, in some cases, fail to observe when the 
couples actually became cohabitants. This could pose a problem, as the 
empirical strategy relies on the individuals being single at the time when the 
premarital productivity is observed. If they are in fact cohabiting, the 
estimation of the spouse’s premarital earnings will be endogenous to the 
individual earnings. To ensure that individuals without children are not already 
cohabiting when we observe them as singles prior to marriage, the sample is 
restricted to couples where the individuals had a registered place of residence 
in different areas three years before marriage. In this case, a geographical 




gives a restricted sample of 10,313 couples; the descriptive statistics for this 
smaller sample can be found in Table A7 the Appendix. Compared to the full 
sample, people not residing in the same geographical area prior to marriage on 
average are older, have lower education and have lower earnings. The 
correlation in earnings residuals for the smaller restricted sample is 0.0794 in 
1994. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the restricted sample of women (Table A8) give 
results very similar to those presented for the full sample. There seem to be 
negative effects for younger women and some signs of positive effects for the 
older age groups. For males, the results are in line with those presented above 
for the full sample; negative effects are only found for the youngest group of 
males. 
 
Overall, the results are fairly robust to changes in sample restrictions and the 






In this paper, the effect of the spouse’s premarital productivity, or the 
unobserved traits assumed to be positively correlated with productivity, on 
individual earnings in marriage is studied. Using longitudinal data from 
Swedish population registers allows the observation of males and females 
before they marry, which is essential in order to identify the effect of 
premarital productivity on earnings in marriage. Theoretically, the 
productivities may be substitutes in the household production function, and 
specialization will occur. Another possibility is that the productivities of The Effects of Assortative Mating on Earnings…   
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spouses are complements in the labor market, which means that the high 
productivity of the spouse will yield positive effects on one’s own earnings. 
 
Generally, the results indicate a negative effect of the spouse’s premarital 
productivity on earnings. In other words, a higher premarital labor market 
productivity of one of the spouses translates to lower earnings of the other 
spouse in marriage. This result holds for both males and females on average. 
Even though the marriage market matches individuals with similar economic 
attributes together, i.e., positive assortative mating on earnings, there is 
evidence of specialization within the marriage. There are also results indicating 
that the negative effect is enhanced by the years spent in marriage. This is in 
line with the specialization hypothesis that predicts that the effect will increase 
as the partners obtain increasingly specific skills.  
 
However, closer examination shows that it is the sample of young men and 
women that are driving the results. Males and females over 35 years of age do 
not seem to be affected negatively by their spouse’s premarital productivity. 
For the women over 45, the results even indicate a positive effect of the 
husband’s productivity. Males over 35 years of age do not seem to be affected 
by their wives’ premarital productivities. The negative results for the younger 
groups of males and females are stable to changes in sample restrictions. A 
possible explanation for differences in results between age groups may be that 
the demands for household work are greater for young couples when starting a 
family and rearing small children. The positive effect of husband’s 
productivity on earnings for women over 45 years old is consistent with the 
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Table A1. Definitions of variables. 
Variable name  Description 
Married  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is married in year t; zero 
otherwise. 
 
Years as married  Number of years married in year t.  
 
Total annual earnings  Total  gross  wage  earnings from employment and self-employment. 
Deflated by the consumer price index to the year-2000 price level. 
 
Age In  years. 
 
Education   The levels of schooling as indicated in the registers of Statistics Sweden 
are transformed into years of schooling in the following way: 7 years for 
the old compulsory school, 9 years for the new compulsory school, 11 
years for short upper-secondary school, 12 years for long upper-secondary 
school, 14 years for short university, 15.5 for long university and 19 years 
for a doctoral degree.  
 
Children   Dummy equal to one if the individual has children, zero otherwise. 
 
Parental  benefit    Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual receives any parental 
benefit, zero otherwise. Parental benefit is payable for 450 days for 
children born before 2002 to parents who stay away from work to be with 
a child. The parental benefit days are always shared equally between both 
parents, but one parent may give up the parental benefits to the other 
parent. The amount you receive is a function of your annual income.  
 
Sweden   Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is born in Sweden, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Self  employed  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is self-employed, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Farming  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in farming, 
zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in 
manufacturing, zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Construction  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in 
construction, zero otherwise.Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Retail  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in retailing, 
zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Private sector  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in the private 
service sector, zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 




Table A1 continued 
Variable name  Description 
Public sector  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual is employed in the 
public sector, zero otherwise. Classification is by SNI 92. 
 
Stockholm  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in Stockholm, 
zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
East Middle Sweden  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual residence in East 
Middle Sweden, zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
Smaland and the islands  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in Smaland and 
the islands, zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
South Sweden  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in South Sweden, 
zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
West Sweden  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in West Sweden, 
zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
North Middle Sweden  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in North Middle 
Sweden, zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
Middle Norrland  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in Middle 
Norrland, zero otherwise. Classification according to NUTS-2. 
 
Upper Norrland  Dummy variable, equal to one if the individual lives in Upper 
























Table A2. OLS of the spouse’s pre marital earnings equation. 
  Females Males 
  1994 1995  1994  1995 
  Robustness check   Robustness check
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Table A2 continued 
Variable 1994  1995  1994  1995 


















         
R
2  0.25 0.25 0.22 0.21
Number of observations  16,986  17,067  16,678  16,786 
Note I: Also included are dummy variables indicating the country of birth. Note II: Standard errors




Tabell A3. Estimates of the earnings equations for females 























   -0.009
(0.002)





Sector of employment, Student 
and Self-employed  No No Yes  Yes 
Children and parental leave.  No No No Yes 
      
Hausman 957.32  968.28  1933.91  1711.64 
AdjR
2  0.34 0.34 0.35 0.37 
Number of observations  155,536  155,536  155,536  155,536 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 





Table A4. Estimates of the earnings equations for females, conditional on age 
group.  
Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model2 
Married  -0.419 
(0.009) 


































Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-
employed 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Children and parental 
leave.  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Hausman  1534.17 1552.27  232.67 232.75 156.23  156.58 
Adj R
2  0.34 0.34  0.46  0.46  0.56  0.56 
Number of observations  120,803 26,449  8,284 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Table A5. Estimates of the earnings equations for males. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model4 




























Sector of employment 
Student and Self-employed  No No  Yes  Yes 
Children and parental leave.  No No No  Yes 
       
Hausman  875.110 1019.270  2768.530  2602.060 
Adj R
2 0.54  0.54  0.55  0.55 
Number of observations  159,941  159,941  159,941  159,941 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 




Table A6. Estimates of the earnings equations for males, conditional on age
group 
Áge 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 
































(0.002)   
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-
employed 
Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Children and Parental 
leave.  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
Hausman  1667.06 1673.07  602.02  716.66 467.90 472.20 
Adj R
2  0.53  0.53 0.58  0.58 0.62 0.62 
Number of 
bi
106,634 38,410 14,897 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 
10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 





Table A7. Descriptive statistics for females and males in 1994 and 1997, 
restricted sample. 
 Females  Males 
 1994  1997  1994  1997 
Variable  Mean  St. Dev. Mean  St. Dev.  Mean  St. Dev. Mean  St. Dev.
Total annual 
earnings (SEK 100) 
1282.7 764.9 1236.3  987.1 1808.5 1427.5 2219.9 1652.0 
Age  32.22  6.32 35.23 6.29 34.30  6.89 37.19 6.86 
Education (in years)  12.26  2.03  12.31  2.23  12.29  2.18  12.07  2.43 
Children  0.39  0.71  0.06   0.72  
Parental  benefit   0.28  0.57  0.12   0.44  
Born in Sweden   0.90    0.90    0.90    0.90   
Self  employed  0.01  0.01  0.04   0.05  
Student  0.13  0.07  0.05   0.04  
Farming 0.01    0.005    0.01    0.01   
Manufacturing  0.09  0.10  0.22   0.23  
Construction  0.01  0.01  0.11   0.10  
Retail  0.21  0.19  0.26   0.26  
Private  sector  0.13  0.14  0.15   0.16  
Public  sector  0.55  0.52  0.24   0.21  
Stockholm  0.32  0.32  0.31   0.31  
East  Middle  Sweden  0.15  0.15  0.15   0.15  
Smaland and the 
islands  0.05  0.05  0.05   0.05  
South  Sweden  0.12  0.12  0.13   0.13  
West  Sweden  0.18  0.18  0.18   0.18  
North Middle 
Sweden 
0.08  0.08  0.08   0.08  
Middle  Norrland 0.04  0.04  0.04   0.04  
Upper  Norrland  0.05  0.05  0.05   0.05  
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Table A8. Estimates of the earnings equations for females, conditional on age
group. Restricted sample 
  Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 







***  -0.226 
(0.018) 
  -0.019 
(0.030) 
  -0.020 
(0.030) 






  -0.028 
(0.021) 
















Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-employed Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Children and parental 
leave.  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
            
Hausman  810.720 833.770 162.620 162.470 -62.20  -66.62 
Adj R
2  0.34 0.34  0.46  0.46  0.59  0.59 
Number of observations  57,158 16,960  4,878 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a 




Table A9. Estimates of the earnings equations for males, conditional on age
group. Restricted sample 
  Age 25-34  Age 35-44  Age 45-51 


























married    
-0.004
(0.002)
**   0.005 
(0.003) 
   -0.004 
(0.005) 
Sector of employment, 
Student and Self-employed
Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Children and parental 
leave. 
Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
           
Hausman  866.590 868.610  396.780  504.530 309.20  303.42 
Adj R
2  0.53  0.53 0.58  0.58 0.61  0.61 
Number of observations  49,096 23,658 9,057 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes that the coefficients are significant on a
10/5/1  percent level, respectively.  IV 
Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings 
Among Women in First and Second Marriages 
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This study examines spousal matching for females in second-order marriages. 
It is based on detailed data from longitudinal Swedish population data 
registers. We aim to follow women who marry, divorce, and subsequently 
remarry compared with females who marry and stay married over the course of 
the study interval. The earnings of both groups are modeled through regression 
analysis in the year prior to their marriages along with the earnings of each 
husband. The residuals from the regressions represent unobservables in the 
process of earnings generation. From the regressions we obtain spouse-to-be 
pairs of earnings residuals and we measure the correlation of residuals for each 
marital regime. Overall, we find significant positive correlations for all three of 
the marital partitions. The correlation tends to be smaller for the first of a 
sequence of marriages for women who divorce than for women who marry and 
stay so. For the second of the successive marriages, however, the correlation of 
the residuals is larger than that for women who marry but once. We also find 
evidence of “matching” between successive husbands. Women who marry 
men with unmeasured positive earnings capacities, in the event of divorce, 
tend to select and match in a similar fashion the second time around. 
 
Keywords:.Marital matching, Remarriage, Assortative mating, Earnings. 
JEL Classification: J12. 
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I  Introduction 
 
In the final decades of the twentieth century, many Western countries 
witnessed marked changes in the timing of marriage and the frequency of 
marital dissolution. These phenomena occurred at the same time social 
scientists developed interest in the determinants and consequences of marital 
formation and divorce. Economists and sociologists in particular have devoted 
attention to the effects on marriage of labor force outcomes such as 
employment and earnings. Viewing marriage as an institution in the context of 
markets, Becker (1974; 1981) and subsequent researchers focused on factors 
that tend to match individuals as spouses. A natural outgrowth of that endeavor 
was research concerning determinants of separation and divorce, as 
exemplified by Becker, Landes and Michael (1977). These early studies were 
followed by a substantial volume of research on marital matching and 
determinants and consequences of divorce. 
 
Accompanying the trend in marital disruption has been pervasive incidence of 
remarriage; a substantial proportion of individuals who end their first 
marriages tend to enter subsequent unions. The remarriage phenomenon has 
engendered efforts to delineate socioeconomic factors and individual 
characteristics that explain formation of second marriages. Early examples in 
this literature include Thornton (1978), Hutchens (1979), and Wolf and 
MacDonald (1979). What has been largely unexplored in the remarriage 
literature is the phenomenon of second-spouse matching and how it compares 
to first-marriage matching. An exception is Mueller and Pope (1980), who 
compare occupational status among successive husbands of twice-married 
women. Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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This study attempts to extend the literature by examining spouse matching in 
second order marriages of females. It exploits detailed data registers from the 
Swedish population, which are compiled by Statistics Sweden and the Labor 
Market Board of Sweden. The registers are longitudinal in nature, which 
allows us to follow a sample of females through time. For the subset of women 
who first marry, then dissolve their marriages and subsequently enter into 
second marriages, we can examine the statistical anatomy of the successive 
matches; our particular interest, as we explain in Section III below, is matching 
on the basis of unmeasured determinants of earnings, which manifest 
themselves in residuals from estimated earnings equations. The estimates are 
based on regression based pairings of females with their respective first 
husbands and, later in the longitudinal file, with their second husbands. 
Because the data allow us to track both spouses back to years preceding the 
marriages, we are able to examine matching in its true sense, i.e., prior to the 
formation of each marriage. This “back to the future” feature of the data has 
previously been exploited by Nakosteen, Westerlund and Zimmer (2004), who 
restrict their attention to first marriages. Accordingly, for purposes of 
comparison, in our empirical analysis we likewise present estimates for a 
separate sample of once-married women. 
Although the principle contribution of this research is to provide insight into 
the a priori matching process of a given female with two successive husbands, 
it also creates an opportunity to examine the “matching” process that unites the 
husbands. Although the husbands clearly do not choose one another in the 
marriage market, the phenomenon that potentially links them is their common 
selection by the same female at two different points in time. The sample design 
of this study is unique in facilitating analysis of the extent, if any, to which this 
indirect matching of successive husbands manifests itself in the process of 





The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an 
overview of previous research. Since we focus on the phenomenon of spouse 
selection in the context of remarriage, our review of the traditional literature 
concerning determinants of marriage and divorce is somewhat perfunctory, as 
we refer the reader to references contained in selected papers from that body of 
research. Section III establishes the statistical framework for the empirical 
analysis, while Section IV presents estimates of the critical parameters. Section 
V summarizes and concludes the study. 
 
II Background 
This section presents an overview of selected previous research that motivates 
the present study. For our purposes, the most succinct classification of the 
literature is with respect to (1) marital matching; (2) determinants of divorce; 
and (3) studies of remarriage. 
Marital Matching and Sorting of Spouses 
In a paper that launched a substantial amount of modern research on marriage, 
Becker (1974) argued that spouses tend to match on the basis of market and 
home specialization. His hypothesis is that optimal marital sorting is based on 
comparative advantage within the spouse pair; husbands, typically possessing 
greater earning potential, engage in mar k e t  w o r k  t o  e x p l oit the advantage, 
while wives specialize in home production and family rearing. Empirical 
testing of Becker’s hypothesis has relied in part on earnings regressions for 
married couples, using the models to obtain earnings residuals. The negative 
correlation implied by Becker’s specialization hypothesis has not been a Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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common finding. Smith (1979) obtained residual correlations of 0.098 for 
white couples and 0.035 for blacks. Becker (1981) estimated partial 
correlations for spouses’ wages, controlling for age and schooling, obtained 
0.32 for white couples and 0.24 for blacks. These results are suggestive of 
positive spouse sorting, a result that is further supported by Lam (1988). 
One shortcoming of residual correlations for existing marriages is that they are 
likely reflective of factors that manifest themselves after marriage, and thus 
might not be informative about the sorting process that paired the spouses to 
begin with. This challenge is addressed by Nakosteen, Westerlund and Zimmer 
(2004), who use the Swedish register data to estimate residual correlations for 
spouses based on the period immediately prior to marriage. Using two distinct 
marriage cohorts, their estimates range from 0.203 for the full sample to 0.08 
for a sample restricted on the basis of data imputations. These estimates, which 
differ significantly from zero, are further evidence of positive marital sorting, 
again contrary to Becker’s (1974) original hypothesis. Readers may refer to the 
above cited paper for further references in the marital sorting literature. 
Divorce and Remarriage 
In early work on marital dissolution, Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) view 
married persons as if they assess the expected gains from remaining married 
relative to the costs associated with divorce. Dissolution results when expected 
utility from remaining married is less than expected utility after divorce. 
Marriages that are formed at young ages, reflecting a period of abbreviated 
search for a suitable spouse, are relatively prone to divorce. Traits that tend to 
raise the utility from remaining married, thereby sustaining the union, include 
marriage-specific capital in the form of children or household wealth. Becker, 
Landes and Michael (1977) also postulate that marriages tend to fail in the face 





by Starkey (1991). Following the theme of earnings stability, Weiss and Willis 
(1997) find that unexpectedly high earnings of husbands tend to reduce the 
likelihood of divorce, whereas in the case of wives, earnings “surprises” have 
the opposite effect. Readers may refer to the latter paper for additional 
references in the literature on marriage dissolution. 
Previous research on remarriage has attempted to identify factors that match 
individuals with new partners after the end of their first marriages. In view of 
the often adverse economic effects of divorce on women, much attention has 
focused on female transitions back to marriage. Smock (1990), using data from 
the 1988 National Survey of Families and Households, compares the 
remarriage experiences of blacks and whites. Her evidence indicates that less 
educated blacks experience a diminished rate of return to marriage, while no 
significant education effect is apparent for whites. On the other hand, 
remarriage prospects of whites tend to diminish with age, while there is no 
significant age effect among blacks. For both race groups, those with three or 
more children and those who separate at relatively older ages are less likely to 
remarry. 
Chiswick and Lehrer (1990) analyze a sample of women from the 1982 
National Survey of Family Growth. Among whites, transitions to marriage are 
more likely among those with no children and whose first marriages were of 
relatively short duration, and less likely for those older than 28 years of age. A 
similar age pattern holds for blacks, but blacks appear not to have an adverse 
effect of longer durations in their first marriages, and unlike whites there is no 
apparent effect associated with absence of children. Chiswick and Lehrer’s 
model implies two hypotheses concerning husbands in second marriages. First, 
the economic status of the second husband should be positively associated 
with the duration of the wife’s first marriage. As far as we can determine, this 
has not been subjected to empirical scrutiny. Second, the second husband’s Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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economic status should be negatively associated with the number of children 
from the wife’s first marriage. Modest support for that proposition has been 
reported by Duncan and Hoffman (1985: Table 14.1), using data from the 
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In a finding that bears 
directly on this study, Duncan and Hoffman also report a strongly significant 
positive relation between earnings of the second husband and earnings of the 
first husband.  
Hutchens (1979) analyzes the effect of welfare receipt (in the form of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children) on remarriage prospects of female 
household heads. Using data from the PSID, his principal findings indicate that 
welfare receipt is associated with diminished remarriage prospects. In addition, 
marriage transitions decline with age and are lower among nonwhites. Wolf 
and MacDonald (1979), in a departure from other studies, examine the relation 
between earnings and remarriage for men. Using a sample from the state of 
Wisconsin, their findings indicate that males’ remarriage prospects are not 
related to the level of or variation in their earnings, and similarly not by their 
earnings relative to appropriate peer groups. However, measures of permanent 
income show a positive impact on remarriage prospects.  
Mueller and Pope (1980) analyze differences in occupational status between 
successive husbands of twice married women; as such, their paper appears to 
be the most closely related to the present study, insofar as it reveals something 
indirectly about the matching process characterizing the behavior of twice-
married women. Based on the 1970 National Fertility Survey, Mueller and 
Pope cross classify the occupations of women’s first and second husbands. 
Their results indicate that approximately 50 percent of remarrying women 
“marry up” in the sense of matching with second husbands in higher 





and the remaining 30 percent experience no change in husbands’ occupational 
status. 
These studies provide insight concerning the process of remarriage. This is 
potentially important for purposes of public policy, given the substantially 
lower incomes of households headed by single mothers who are divorced or 
never married, and since marriage represents a potential escape from poverty 
for single mothers and their children. What the remarriage literature has not yet 
addressed is the issue of marital matching in second marriages. Knowledge of 
the matching process can contribute to better understanding of the extent, if 
any, to which matching in second marriages differs from first marriages. In 
particular, given the pervasiveness of higher-order marriages in many 
countries, improved understanding of the sorting process that brings second 
spouses together can be informative about the long term stability of second 
versus first marriages. The following section describes a statistical framework 
in which that question can be addressed for the Swedish data. 
 
III Statistical  Framework 
The unit of observation in this study is an initially married female, and the data 
record includes information on as many as two husbands. As we noted in 
Section I, we partition the sample into those whose marriages remain intact for 
the duration of the sample period (hereafter referred to as “once-married”), and 
those who experience dissolution and subsequently remarry (hereafter “twice-
married”). We observe the twice-married females at two points in time, 
immediately prior to the first and second marriages. We also observe a 


















1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ε β + =      (2) 
where  fi Y refers to the logarithm of annual earnings for female i.   The 
superscript refers to the period preceding the first marriage which in this case 
ultimately culminates in divorce. On the right hand side,  fi x denotes a vector 
of explanatory variables and  f β is a conformable vector of unknown 
coefficient parameters. The random error term  fi ε is normally distributed with 
zero mean and unknown variance  2
1 | D f ε σ . Equation (2) represents the analogous 
equation for the first husband, with variables and parameters subscripted 
accordingly and with the normally distributed error term possessing zero mean 
along with variance 
2
1 | D m ε σ  .   
 
For the second marriage of the same woman, the pair of earnings equations is 
represented as: 





fi x Y ε β + =       (3) 





mi x Y ε β + =  ,     (4) 
with analogous subscripting and superscripting. Here, the error terms possess 
respective variances 
2
2 | D f ε σ  and 
2
2 | D m ε σ .  It is worth repeating that, inherent in 
the sample design, the data that generate equations (3) and (4) are recorded 
after the dissolution of the first marriage but before the inception of the 
second. In that sense, in both cases the model knows the marriage will dissolve 
before the spouses themselves do.  






For stable marriages, the pair of earnings equations is specified as: 





fi x Y ε β + =
     (5)
 





mi x Y ε β + =  ,     (6) 
with the S superscript signifying a stable marriage for the duration of the 
sample period. The other symbols are defined in a manner analogous to (1) – 
(4), and the error terms possess respective variances denoted by 
2
|S f ε σ  and 
2
|S m ε σ . 
 
The data set permits estimation of equations (1) – (4) for the sample partition 
of twice-married women and equations (5) – (6) for the partition of once-
married women. From these regressions we obtain spouse-to-be pairs of 
earnings residuals, which represent estimates of unmeasured disturbances to 
earnings for each individual. The emphasis on unmeasured attributes is due to 
the nature of the marriage experience as it relates to earnings. In one respect it 
is a matter of course that measured earnings of spouses tend to be correlated. 
For example, it is well known that individuals tend to marry partners with 
similar levels of formal schooling, and of similar ethnicity, which are in turn 
correlated with earnings. They tend to marry persons similar in age, and 
earnings progress with age as they gain work experience. Moreover, spouses 
reside in the same region and therefore share the economic fortunes of the 
regional economy. Consequently, our preferred measure of marital matching, 
following Becker (1981), Smith (1979), and others, is the estimated correlation 
between residuals. The residuals capture latent characteristics of individuals 
that affect earnings but are not accounted for by explanatory variables such as 
schooling, age, or region of residence. Although not observed by the 
researcher, these characteristics are likely visible to potential spouses, and they 
include traits such as confidence, ambition, possible family connections that Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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impact earnings, and mental or emotional health. Our essential premise is that, 
in addition to exerting an unmeasured positive impact on earnings, such traits 
increase the attractiveness of individuals as potential marriage partners.  
 
The three sets of regressions described above produce three estimated 
correlations between spouses, and they permit a fourth one of interest, namely 
the correlation between first and second husbands for twice-married women. 
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The numerators in each expression represent covariances between the 
respective error terms identified in the subscripts. In the first, second, and 
fourth cases, positive estimates indicate presence of spouse selection on the 
basis of similar earnings traits: individuals who for unmeasured reasons tend to 
earn above the regression corrected mean tend to select as spouses those with 
similar earnings tendencies.  Negative estimates, on the other hand, are 
indicative of specialization by spouses in the spirit of Becker’s (1974) 
hypothesis. We have an interest in the comparative magnitudes of the first two 
cases, as they provide evidence of the extent to which the matching process 
evolves, if at all, between first and second marriages. The third parameter 
conveys a different dimension of matching. What the two husbands have in 





correlation would indicate that, if the first husband exhibits substantial 
unmeasured strength in earnings, there is a tendency for the second one to be 
similarly above the mean. 
 
 
IV  Data and Sample 
 
We estimate income equations and analyze the pre-marital residual 
correlations using longitudinal data with yearly observations 1990-2003 on a 
larger sample of married or cohabitating couples. From the total Swedish 
population in the year 2001 we sampled all females aged 20-65 who were  
married or cohabitating in that year, and who were living as single at least once 
during 1990-2000. Using family identification codes we merged all males 
married or cohabitating at least once with at least one individual in the sample 
of females. This means that we confine the analysis to female-male couples 
and exclude the relatively few observations of same sex registered partnerships 
from our sample.  
 
Cohabitation is common in Sweden, it is generally accepted, and having 
children without being married is not controversial. The variable indicating 
family status is subject to measurement error in that cohabitation is only 
registered if the couple has at least one common child living in the household. 
This is most likely of minor importance here, since most cases of childless 
cohabitation represent short lived relationships between relatively young 
individuals. For the sake of simplicity, from this point we use the terms 
married and marriage synonymous with cohabitating and cohabitation.  
 
In the sampling process we encountered a small sample of females being 
married with the same person in sequences,  with one year registered as single 
in between. These observations are presumably the result of coding errors or Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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cases were children in cohabitating couples moves in and out from the 
household. Therefore, we classified these observations as stable couples as 
long as the female repeatedly became “remarried” with the same male. Our 
final sample consists of 367,834 females who married only once, and 71,297 
who married at least twice 1990-2000.  
 
Of the latter sample, we have pre-marriage observations for both first and 
second marriage for 24 089 females.
1 For the females married only once we 
identified 361 272 husbands and for the females married twice we identified 
68 272 husbands. We are not able to observe pre-marriage attributes of the first 
husband for marriages taking place before 1991. This limitation leaves us with 
23 450 observations that include husband’s attributes before the first as well as 
before the second marriage. The samples are reduced somewhat in the 
statistical analysis because of missing values and the requirement of positive 
pre-marriage earnings to be included in the estimation of income equations. 
The exact numbers of remaining observations are given in each step of the 
analysis.  
 
Table 1 contains variable definitions and descriptive statistics for variables 
included in the earnings regressions. The explanatory variables include age and 
its square, indicators for the presence of dependent children, region of 
residence, and nativity of birth. The table presents sample means and standard 
deviations for the sample of once-married spouses, limited to those with pre-
marital earnings of more than 50,000 SEK. Descriptive statistics for wives and 
husbands in first and second marriages are given in table A1 in the appendix. 
This partition of the data contains individuals whose average age is in their 
early 30’s, the average slightly larger for men than for women.   
 
                                                 
1 The difference is due to the fact that the first marriage took place before 1991 and therefore not 





Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics. Once Married 
Couples.  
Variable Description  Males  Females 








Education Reference category = maximum 9 years 
primary school. 
  
High school education Dummy variable = 1 if maximum education 





University education  Dummy variable = 1 if maximum education 





Dependent children Reference category = no dependent children 
in the household. 
  
Children Dummy variable = 1 if there are children 





Small children  Dummy variable = 1 if there are children 





Region of residence Reference category = Stockholm region    
East Mid Sweden Dummy variable if residence is in Uppsala, 






Småland Dummy variable if residence is in 






South Sweden  Dummy variable if residence is in Blekinge 





West Sweden Dummy variable if residence is in Halland 





North Mid Sweden Dummy variable if residence is in 





Mid  Norrland  Dummy variable if residence is in 





Upper  Norrland    Dummy variable if residence is 












Number of obs.   300,054  294,896 
Note: Income > 50,000 SEK .The first entry in each cell is the sample mean. Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviations. Sample sizes differ due to earnings restrictions (see Section 
IV) 
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Approximately half of the sample has an high school education or a university 
degree, and most of the population lives in the three highly urbanized areas of 
Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg. We restrict the samples to spouses with 
positive earnings. The problem of sample selection bias induced by excluding 
nonworking women does not seem to be problematic in the case of Sweden, 
since its labor force participation rate for females is one of the highest in the 
world. There is, however, some concern with including all earners, since many 
individuals with near-zero earnings might be part time workers or sporadic in 
their labor force participation. In order to examine our results by income level, 
we present estimates for a sequence of subsets of the sample based on income 
restrictions. In addition to the complete sample, we progressively exclude 
individuals with earnings less that 10,000 SEK; 25,000 SEK; 50,000 SEK; 
75,000 SEK; and finally 100,000 SEK. The sample reductions are based on 
individuals. In particular, we do not use what would have been the more 
restrictive criterion of both spouses satisfying the respective minimum 
thresholds as joint requirements for inclusion in the sample. For that reason, 
the samples that produce the regression equations differ in size between 
husbands and wives. To produce the residual correlations within each 
restricted sample, however, we use only the residual pairs for which both 
spouses satisfy the respective earnings restrictions.  
 
We estimate the earnings equations separately for the subsamples of once 
married and, and for those who re-marry, thus allowing for different 






                                                 





V  Results of Estimation 
 
Estimates of the regression model for the sample of once-married spouses are 
presented in Table 2. The estimates correspond to the minimum earnings 
threshold of 50,000 SEK per year. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of annual earnings. Entries in parentheses are standard errors, which 
confirm the strong significance of all explanatory variables. The estimates for 
both genders reveal patterns that are commonly found in cross section   
estimates of earnings. Earnings increase with age, a proxy for work 
experience, and they do so with the familiar concave trajectory. As expected, 
the education coefficients reflect positive returns to schooling relative to the 
category of the minimum compulsory nine years. The region coefficients show 
consistent earnings deficiencies relative to Stockholm, the largest being 
associated with North Mid Sweden and the Norrland regions. The coefficient 
associated with origin status indicates a substantial advantage for native 
Swedes, particularly among men. The R square statistics are consistent with 
most cross section earnings studies, revealing that more than 24 percent of 
sample variation in log earnings is explained by the variables in the model.  
The unexplained portion, subsumed in the residual, forms the unmeasured 
basis on which we calibrate spouse matching in the form of residual 
correlations, as described in Section III. 
 
Proceeding in this fashion, we obtained analogous regression estimates for the 
sample partition of twice-married women, paired in succession with their 
respective husbands. In each case we performed the estimations for the sample 
subsets defined by the progressive earnings exclusions, as described in Section 
III. For the sake of brevity, we do not present the results of those 23 pairs of  
regressions here. After obtaining the residuals, we estimate the residual 
correlations, which are presented in Table 3.  
 Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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Table 2. Estimates of the Earnings Model: Once Married Couples.  












































































       
R-Square  0.235    0.288   
s.e.  0.366    0.315   
N  300,054    294,896   
Note: Earnings > 50,000 SEK. Figures in parentheses are absolute standard errors. Marital 
year dummies omitted from listing. Sample sizes differ due to earnings restrictions.  
 
 





Several noteworthy patterns emerge in the table. Most noticeable is the 
persistence of positive signs, indicating a tendency for matching by spouses on 
the basis of similar rather than contrasting unmeasured earnings capacity. The 
estimates, all of which differ significantly from zero, range from  114 . 0 ˆ = ρ  
(first marriages of twice-married women, incomes restricted above 50,000 
SEK) to  228 . 0 ˆ = ρ  (second marriages of twice marrieds, incomes above 
100,000 SEK). Positive matching occurs across both marriage regimes and for 
all income categories. Looking first at the once-married sample, the 
correlations generally increase in size as the sample is restricted to higher 
income thresholds. The correlation for the subgroup of highest earners, 
203 . 0 ˆ = ρ , is more than 50 percent larger than that of the population as a 
whole; in this select group, positive matching is particularly strong. These 
estimates contrast with the first marriages in the twice-married sample in two 
respects. First, they are larger in every earnings-excluded sample than their 
counterparts in the population of unstable marriages. Second, the gap between 
the estimates increases, albeit somewhat unevenly, as the exclusion threshold 
increases.  
 
For the twice married sample, the correlations reveal an added dimension. For 
all the income-excluded samples, the correlation for second marriages exceeds 
that for first marriages,
3 and the discrepancy tends to grow with income. For 
the lowest threshold (Y > 10,000 SEK), the second correlation exceeds the first 
by 9 percent; for the most select income group, the gap increases to 42 percent. 
Marital matching is persistently positive, even in unstable marriages, and it 
tends to strengthen both with income and in the context of second marriages.  
 
 
                                                 
3 F-tests indicate that the hypothesis of equality of parameters is rejected. Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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Table 3. Estimated Residual Correlations 
Income Restriction  Marriage 
Order 
 
Twice Married:  
Husband and Wife 




f ε ε ρ
 




f ε ε ρ  
Twice Married: 
First Husband and 
Second Husband 




m ε ε ρ  
Once Married: 
Husband and Wife 




f ε ε ρ  






















N= 47 705 
(.177) 
























N= 39 303 
(.000) 


























Note: All correlations are significant at the one-percent level or lower. P-values within 
parenthesis are for the test of difference relatively to the correlation pertaining to the first 
marriage among those who marry twice. Calculations based on Fishers’ r to z transformation.  
The number of observations for the first marriage among females with at least two marriages is 
lower than the number of observations for the second marriage. The reason for this is that some 
first marriages took place before 1990. Family codes are only available from 1990 and the 
husbands can not be traced with accuracy in the population registers. Throughout, if nothing else 
is stated, our estimations are based on couples marrying between 1991 and 2003, and the pre-
marriage earnings as single is estimated on observations the year before marriage 1990-2002.  





The estimates are also revealing about the quasi matching of successive 
husbands. As we noted in Section II, this represents association between 
unmeasured earnings capacity between two successive husbands. The 
correlations display a pronounced upward trend as the sample is increasingly 
restricted on the basis of income, indicating that the quasi matching is stronger 
among men with higher earnings. Looking for example at the third earnings 
exclusion sample (Y > 50,000 SEK), the estimated correlation is 0.146. What 
is particularly striking is that the estimate exceeds the correlation between the 
wife, who is common to both marriages, and her first husband. Thus the 
matching of husbands is at least as strong as was the husband-wife matching in 
the first marriage. This estimate is also similar in magnitude to the spouse 
matching for stable marriages in the same earnings exclusion category; the 
latter estimate, 0.164, exceeds the husband matching estimate by only 12 
percent. This contrast remains intact for the two highest income exclusions as 
well. Stated differently, when the sample excludes the lowest earners, first and 
second husbands display an extent of matching that is closer to that of stable 
couples than is the matching in the first husband’s marriage.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the matching estimates for second marriages 
exceed their counterparts among once married for earnings exclusions above 
25,000 SEK. It is tempting to take this as further evidence of stronger 
matching in second marriages. However, the comparison holds only above the 
25,000 SEK threshold, which begs explanation; more important is the lack of 
control, as this comparison does not have the advantage of a common wife as a 
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VI  Assessment and Summary 
 
In this study, we follow women who marry, divorce, and subsequently 
remarry. We also study their counterparts who marry and stay married over the 
course of the study interval.  The earnings of both groups are modeled with 
regression analysis in the year prior to their marriages, as are the earnings of 
each husband. Our focus is on the correlation of the residuals from the 
earnings regression of each marital pair. The residuals represent unobservables 
in the process of earnings generation, and we measure this correlation for each 
marital regime.  We find significant, positive correlations for all three of the 
marital partitions, in orders of magnitude that are consistent with previous 
studies.  Further, the correlation tends to be smaller for the first of a sequence 
of marriages for women who divorce than for women who marry and stay so. 
For the second of the successive marriages, however, the correlation of the 
residuals is larger than that for women who marry but once.  We also find 
evidence of “matching” between successive husbands, which leads to a useful 
inference. Women who marry men with unmeasured positive earnings 
capacities, in the event of divorce, tend to select and match in a similar fashion 
the second time around; if anything, that tendency is stronger in the second 
marriage, and it becomes more pronounced in samples that progressively 
exclude low earners. Another intriguing result is that, for samples exclusive of 
low earners, the strength of quasi matching between successive husbands is at 
least as large and indeed might exceed matching between first husbands and 
first wives. 
 
In view of the substantial incidence of marriage dissolution and remarriage in 
most Western countries, these issues are of substantial importance for policy. 
First is the issue of child and family poverty. Since dissolution tends to exert 
particular economic hardship on females and the children in their custody, a 





tends to mitigate the divorce consequences most effectively for those women 
who are relatively strong earners to begin with. Second, as strong earners tend 
to match over time, whether in first or second marriages, there can arise subtle 
shifts in the distribution of income occasioned by the continuous sorting of 
strong earners. 
 
There is potential for additional research in this area. One question concerns 
the apparent strengthening of matching between first and second marriages for 
those who dissolve their first marriages. It would be useful to corroborate this 
phenomenon from other data sources, in particular for several countries. More 
important, assuming some independent corroboration, is the question of why 
this occurs. Whether it arises from learning that takes place in the first 
marriage, producing a type of economic discernment in the search for a second 
spouse, or more simply that spouses view second marriages in a fundamentally 
different way than first marriages, or perhaps for other reasons, remains an 
interesting question for research. 
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Table A1. Variable means, standard deviations within parenthesis 
  Married once  Married at least twice 





















































































































































































































































































































































N 294,896  300,054  16,122  15,062  49,232  52,349 
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